5. As a general principle, all the scholia quoted in the present study are by Aristonicus. I always alert the reader in the few cases when I discuss a scholium by Didymus, a much more independent scholar, who hence is a much less reliable source for Aristarchean material. T This is a revised version of a paper that I presented at the APA, in Montreal, January 2006. I would like to thank Richard Janko, who read a first version of this paper, the two anonymous referees of Classical Philology for their comments and suggestions, and Thomas Jenkins for proofreading the final version. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
he peripatetic influence on many of the fields developed at Alexandria is undeniable: chronology, ethnography, paradoxography, glossography, literary biography, and bibliography ( pinakes), as well as medicine and mechanics, 1 owe much to the Aristotelian school and its approach to Wissenschaft. In recent years, against Pfeiffer's refusal to see any link between Aristotle and the Alexandrian grammarians, 2 scholars like Gallavotti, Nickau, Lührs, Porter, Montanari, Richardson, and Matthaios 3 have argued in favor of the influence of Aristotle on Alexandrian philology and in particular on Aristarchus' scholarship. Some parallels between Aristotle and Aristarchus can be found in the distinction between Homer and the Cyclic poets; in the idea of the tev loÍ of a work (in particular, the famous statement that the Odyssey had reached its tev loÍ at 23.296); 4 in the theory that the Iliad and the Odyssey are creations of one poet, Homer (schol. Il. 5.60a, 11.147a); and in the importance of the principle of consistency (Homer does not contradict himself ).
In this paper, I would like to return to this issue, focusing in particular on the intellectual relationship between Aristotle and Aristarchus. Passages from the Rhetoric and above all from the Poetics will be compared to the Aristarchean sources from the Homeric scholia. In order to proceed in my analysis, I will take into account only the scholia maiora to the Iliad and the Odyssey and, among them, only those by Aristonicus and, with more caution, by Didymus. 5 These, I believe, are the only secure sources for Aristarchean It is this "etiological" derivation that allows us to look at how Aristarchus analyzes epic poetry in search of Aristotelian criteria, for ultimately these two genres are not so far apart. Aristotle himself emphasizes this (Poet. 1449b16-20): mev rh d' ej stµ ta; me; n tautav , ta; de; ≥dia thÅ Í tragådÇaÍ: diov per o § stiÍ perµ tragådÇaÍ oπde spoudaÇaÍ kaµ fauv lhÍ, oπde kaµ perµ ej pΩn: a ¶ me; n ga; r ej popoiÇa eß cei, uÒ pav rcei t¬Å tragådÇç, a ¶ de; aut¬Å , ou˚ pav nta ej n t¬Å ej popoiÇç.
As for their parts, some are the same, others are particular to tragedy. For this reason, whoever knows about good and inferior tragedies knows about epics too. Tragedy possesses all [the parts] that epic has, but those that it possesses are not all in epic. (Trans. Janko 1987) It is this close relationship between tragedy and epic 9 that allows for the identification of Aristotelian criteria within the work of a Homeric scholar like Aristarchus. If what I am going to argue is sound, Aristarchus knew what the philosopher had said about the affinity between these two genres and therefore thought it legitimate to apply Aristotle's criteria for a good tragedy to epic poetry. The Alexandrians knew some of the Aristotelian works, and whether or not the Poetics was available to them, the dialogue On Poets, in which Aristotle discussed the same topics as in the Poetics, and the Homeric Problems were both known. 10 For Aristotle tragedy is composed of six parts (Poet. 1450a9-10): plot (muÅ qoÍ), characters (hß qh), diction (lev xiÍ), thought (diav noia), spectacle (oß yiÍ), and music (melopoiÇa). In the chapters on epic, he picks up this division again, but rightly states that epic lacks the last two, music and spectacle (Poet. 1459b7-10) .
11 This is a very useful working distinction, which helps Aristotle to set out a systematic view of the main constituents of a tragedy (and of an epos too), as well as to refer to other works such as the Rhetoric for elements that have already been treated elsewhere. This distinction of epic into four elements seems, moreover, to operate also in Aristarchus' methodology, especially when he must decide about an athetesis, for a line is generally judged with reference to its function for the plot, for the characters, for the thought it expresses, and in terms of style. Therefore we will follow this division in our analysis and will see what Aristotle and Aristarchus have to say about the plot, the characters, the thought-element and the style.
9. As proved also by the last chapters of the Poetics (chaps. [23] [24] [25] [26] , where Aristotle focuses on epic poetry, drawing on the previous chapters where he analyzed tragedy. For an account of Aristotle's views on Homer, see Richardson 1992, and 1993, 31-35. 10. Cf. Nickau 1977, 138-39, with n. 16; Lührs 1992 , 14-15, Richardson 1994 . On the debated problem about the destiny of the library and the books of Aristotle, see Moraux 1973, 3-31; Canfora 1988, 34-37, 59-66; Richardson 1994, 8-12; Nagy 1998, 198-206; Barnes 1999; Canfora 2002 . The Poetics in particular does not seem to have enjoyed great popularity in antiquity: ancient soruces are silent, and the earliest quotation is in Porphyry (quoted by Simplicius [in Cat., ): see Janko 1982, and 1991, 7 and n. 25. 11. One problem is, of course, assessing whether this difference can be interpreted as a demonstration that tragedy is a more accomplished form of art than epic. However, there are also advantages in the lack of spectacle in the epos: see p. 286 below.
Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: MUQOS
Since for Aristotle tragedy (and epic too) is an imitation of a complete and whole action (mÇmhsiÍ teleÇaÍ kaµ o § lhÍ prav xewÍ; cf. Poet. 1450b24-25) and the plot (muÅ qoÍ) is defined by Aristotle as the mÇmhsiÍ thÅ Í prav xewÍ (Poet. 1450a3-4), it follows that the plot is "the principle and as it were the soul of tragedy" (Poet. 1450a38-39: arch; me; n ou® n kaµ o∏on yuch; oJ muÅ qoÍ thÅ Í tragådÇaÍ). One of the most important criteria for the plot is that it must be in accordance with probability and necessity (Poet. 1451a36-38 and 1451b8-10): fanero; n de; ej k tΩn e√rhmev nwn kaµ o § ti ou˚ to; ta; genov mena lev gein, touÅ to poihtouÅ eß rgon ej stÇn, all' o∏a aṅ gev noito kaµ ta; dunata; kata; to; e√ko; Í h˙ to; anagka∂on.
It is also obvious from what we have said that it is the function of a poet to relate not things that have happened, but things that may happen, i.e. that are possible in accordance with probability or necessity. (Trans. Janko 1987) eß stin de; kaqov lou mev n, tåÅ poÇå ta; po∂a aß tta sumbaÇnei lev gein h˙ prav ttein kata; to; e√ko; Í h˙ to; anagka∂on, ou• stocav zetai hJ poÇhsiÍ oj nov mata ej pitiqemev nh.
A universal is the sort of thing that a certain kind of person may well say or do in accordance with probability or necessity-this is what poetry aims at, although it assigns names [to the people]. (Trans. Janko 1987) For Aristotle, then, plots can contain what is "necessary" (anagka∂on), but also something which is kata; to; e√kov Í, "according to probability." 12 In other words, a plot must consist of a necessary or probable sequence of events. This is due to the particular status of poetry, which distinguishes it from history: poetry represents universals, not particulars, like history; hence poetry is more philosophical (Poet. 1451b5-7):
dio; kaµ filosof∫teron kaµ spoudaiov teron poÇhsiÍ ¥storÇaÍ ej stÇn: hJ me; n ga; r poÇhsiÍ maÅ llon ta; kaqov lou, hJ d' ¥storÇa ta; kaq' e § kaston lev gei.
For this reason poetry is a more philosophical and more serious thing than history: poetry tends to speak of universals, history of particulars. (Trans. Janko 1987) Moreover, in poetry, elements that are impossible in reality are nevertheless admitted because in this way the poet is able to astonish his audience and achieve amazement (to; qaumastov n: Poet. 1460a17), which is the tev loÍ of poetry (Poet.1460b23-26):
aduv nata pepoÇhtai, hJ mav rthtai: all' oj rqΩÍ eß cei, e√ tugcav nei touÅ tev louÍ touÅ auÒ thÅ Í (to; ga; r tev loÍ e≥rhtai), e√ ou § twÍ ej kplhktik∫teron h˙ auto; h˙ aß llo poie∂ mev roÍ.
12. The same kind of contrast is found again when Aristotle is dealing with episodic plots, where we have one episode after the other without necessity or probability (Poet. 1451b33-35: tΩn de; aÒ plΩn muv qwn kaµ prav xewn a¥ ej peisodi∫deiÍ e√sµn ceÇristai: lev gw d' ej peisodi∫dh muÅ qon ej n å• ta; ej peisov dia met' aß llhla ouß t' e√ko; Í ouß t' anav gkh eπnai ["Among simple plots and actions, episodic [tragedies] are the worst. By 'episodic' I mean a plot in which there is neither probability nor necessity that the episodes follow one other," trans. Janko 1987] ).
[If ] impossibilities have been produced, there is an error; but it is correct, if it attains the end of the art itself. The end has been stated [already, i.e.] if in this way it makes either that part [of the poem], or another part, more astonishing. (Trans. Janko 1987) Since supernatural, impossible elements make the poetry more interesting, 13 Aristotle judges the plot not according to whether it is possible or not, but whether it is piqanov Í/apÇqanoÍ, "believable or not" (Poet. 1460a26-27 and 1461b9-12):
proaire∂sqaÇ te de∂ aduv nata e√kov ta maÅ llon h˙ dunata; apÇqana.
Impossible [incidents] that are believable should be preferred to possible ones that are unbelievable. (Trans. Janko 1987) o § lwÍ de; to; aduv naton me; n pro; Í th; n poÇhsin h˙ pro; Í to; bev ltion h˙ pro; Í th; n dov xan de∂ anav gein. prov Í te ga; r th; n poÇhsin a¥ret∫teron piqano; n aduv naton h˙ apÇqanon kaµ dunatov n:
In general, the impossibility should be explained with reference either to the composition, or to [making something] better [than it is], or to opinion. In relation to [the needs of ] the composition, a believable impossibility is preferable to an unbelievable possibility. (Trans. Janko 1987) What is "probable" (e√kov Í) is thus also "believable" (piqanov n). Thus it is better for Aristotle to choose plots that are believable-though they may not be possible in the real world (piqana; aduv nata)-than stories that could happen but are not believable (dunata; apÇqana).
14 Since a poet, in order to achieve to; qaumastov n, has more freedom, the criterion of "believability" becomes an internal one: something is believable if it follows from what has been stated before as a logical consequence. Within a work of poetry there are rules that are typical of poetry and, as long as these rules are respected by the poet, the poetic work is good, no matter how the muÅ qoÍ in itself corresponds to truth in the real world. The premise behind these prescriptions is that poetry is a tev cnh that works according to rules that are its own and different from those of other tev cnai (Poet. 1460b13-15): 15 pro; Í de; touv toiÍ ouc hJ auth; oj rqov thÍ ej stµn thÅ Í politikhÅ Í kaµ thÅ Í poihtikhÅ Í oude; aß llhÍ tev cnhÍ kaµ poihtikhÅ Í.
In addition, there is not the same [standard of ] correctness in the art of civic life as in that of poetry, nor is there in any other art as in that of poetry. (Trans. Janko 1987) 3.1 Aristarchus: The Criterion of Believability As for Aristotle, so also for Aristarchus, the main criterion for judging the plot is not the distinction between what is possible and what is not, but that 13. In this light, Homer is a master of lies (Poet. 1460a18-19: dedÇdacen de; mav lista £OmhroÍ kaµ tou; Í aß llouÍ yeudhÅ lev gein wÒ Í de∂ ["Homer above all has taught the other [poets] to tell untruths in the right way," trans. Janko 1987] ).
14. This is because what is possible is believable, but not all that is believable is possible; hence believability is a wider concept, as Aristotle explains at Poet. 1451b16-19: a≥tion d' o § ti piqanov n ej sti to; dunatov n: ta; me; n ou® n mh; genov mena ouß pw pisteuv omen eπnai dunatav , ta; de; genov mena fanero; n o § ti dunatav : ou˚ ga; r aṅ ej gevneto, e√ h® n aduv nata. ("The reason is that what is possible is believable; we do not believe that what has never happened is possible, but things which have happened are obviously possible-they would have not have happened if they were impossible," trans. Janko 1987 shmeÇwsai kaµ o § ti to; perµ tΩn d∫deka sakev wn kaµ to; ej fexhÅ Í ÂrÇstarcoÍ aqethv saÍ kecÇaken, aduv naton eπnai e√pøn tosauÅ ta bastav sai aß nqrwpon.
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Note also that Aristarchus athetized and marked with a chi the line about the twelve shields and the following one, saying that it was impossible that a person could carry all these [weapons] . 18 Nevertheless, in the Iliad, for example, there are no cases of athetesis due to aduv nata.
19 Only at Iliad 2.667, when Homer tells the story of Tlepolemus arriving at Rhodes after killing his uncle Licymnius, Zenodotus' reading aπya d' o § g' ej Í ÔRov don (instead of auta; r o § g' ej Í ÔRov don) was dismissed by Aristarchus because it would be impossible for a fugitive wandering in the Aegean to arrive "at once" at Rhodes. 20 Otherwise, elements that are impossible from a rational point of view are allowed because of poetic license. For example, the fact that the Cyclops knows that ships exist or understands Greek is in itself absurd, but for Aristarchus it is to be kept, because it is poetry (schol. HMQR Od. 3.71): oJ de; ÂrÇstarcoÍ o√keiov teron autou; Í tetav cqai ej n tåÅ lov gå touÅ Kuv klwpov Í fhsin: . . . dotev on dev , fhsÇ, tåÅ poiht¬Å ta; toiauÅ ta.
21 kaµ ga; r nauÅ n auto; n parav gei e√dov ta, "allav moi e≥f' o § ph eß sceÍ √øn euergev a nhÅ a" (Od. 9.279), kaµ sunÇhsin ÔEllhnÇda fwnhv n.
Aristarchus says that these lines are more properly included in the speech of the Cyclops [than here in Telemachus' speech]. . . . But, he says, we must allow these [licenses] to the poet. For Homer represents the Cyclops as aware [of the existence] of a ship, [as it is proved by] "but tell me where, arriving, you put your well-made ship" (Od. 9.279), and [the Cyclops] understands the Greek language.
16. An episode that was particularly suspicious to Aristarchus; see p. 288 below. 17. Eustathius is here probably quoting Aristonicus (see Carnuth 1869, ad loc.) from a collection of scholia richer than the one that has reached us (and which does not present any scholium on Od. 22.144-45).
18. The possibility that Melanthius might have carried all these weapons in more than one journey does not seem to have been taken into consideration by Aristarchus.
19. The only case of dunat-coming up in Aristarchean scholia is at Il. 21.475: aj po; touv tou aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi tre∂Í: ou˚ duv natai ga; r oJ a√douv menoÍ "patrokasignhv toio mighv menai ej n palav m¬sin" (Il. 21.469) aeµ prokale∂sqai to; n PoseidΩna ej n tåÅ ∆Oluv mpå pro; Í mav chn. This ou˚ duv natai ga; r . . . , however, is due to internal inconsistency or aprev peia of a character; according to Aristarchus it is "impossible" that Apollo once boasted that he was going to fight against his uncle Poseidon, if he is now afraid to face him. This is thus definitely not an athetesis due to something that is "impossible" from an objective point of view. 20. Schol. Il. 2.667: auta; r o § g' ej Í ÔRov don: o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ grav fei "aπya d' o § g' ej Í ÔRov don." ou˚ duv natai de; tacev wÍ ej lhluqev nai ej pµ th; n ÔRov don oJ prov teron me; n nauÅ Í pephc∫Í, eπta al∫menoÍ kaµ ouk †euqu; ploikΩÍ †.
21. This closely resembles the Aristotelian remark: dÇdomen ga; r tauÅ ta to∂Í poihta∂Í in Poet. 1460b13, apropos of metaphors and glossai.
A similar attitude is to be found in Aristotle when he comments on the episode of the bath in the Odyssey: Eurycleia's recognition of Odysseus is in itself aß logon, but it is allowed because in this way the poet achieved to; qaumastov n (Poet. 1460a11-26) . This is to be connected with the comparison between tragedy and epic: according to Aristotle an advantage epic has over tragedy is that, lacking oß yiÍ, it can afford to be aß logoÍ, because the audience, not seeing the plot performed, is likely to notice irrationalities and incongruities less (Poet. 1460a11-14): de∂ me; n ou® n ej n ta∂Í tragådÇaiÍ poie∂n to; qaumastov n, maÅ llon d' ej ndev cetai ej n t¬Å ej popoiÇç to; aß logon, di' o ¶ sumbaÇnei mav lista to; qaumastov n, dia; to; mh; oJ raÅ n e√Í to; n prav ttonta. The main criterion for Aristarchus, as for Aristotle, is thus that of probability. Facts in the poems often receive comments along these lines: something takes place according to probability (e√kov twÍ) and is therefore acceptable. For example, in the Doloneia (Il. 10.447) Diomedes addresses Dolon by name: "mh; dhv moi fuv xin ge Dov lwn ej mbav lleo qumåÅ " ("Do not, Dolon, have in your mind any thought of escape"), and some ancient scholars found fault in the fact that Diomedes seems to know the name of Dolon, though this is the first time that they meet. On this basis they read dolΩn, the participle of dolov w, "to deceive" ("Do not have in your mind any thought of escape, trying to deceive me"). Aristarchus, however, defended the text: for him, it was probable (e√kov Í) that the Greeks knew the name of some of their enemies after ten years of siege (schol. Il. 10.447a):
Dov lwn: o § ti zhte∂tai, pΩÍ to; oß noma eß gnw: diov tineÍ anev gnwsan "dolΩn" wÒ Í noΩn. . . . e√ko; Í dev tinwn gin∫skesqai oj nov mata wÒ Í aṅ dekaetouÅ Í gegonov toÍ crov nou, kaµ mav lista touÅ Dov lwnoÍ: h® n ga; r khv rukoÍ u¥o; Í "poluv crusoÍ poluv calkoÍ" (cf. Il. 10.314-15). Dolon: [the diple is] because there is a question about how [Diomedes] knew his name; hence some scholars read dolΩn, "deceiving," perispomenon like noΩn. . . . But it is probable that they knew the names of some of them, since a decade had passed [with them there], and in particular the name of Dolon. For he was son of a herald, "rich in gold, rich in bronze" This criterion of probability is mainly expressed in Aristonicus' scholia by the couple piqanov Í / apÇqanoÍ. It is one of the most common justifications given for an athetesis or for rejecting Zenodotus' readings which, according to Aristarchus, often lack believability. For example, in the assembly of the Achaean leaders at Iliad 2.50-86, Aristarchus did not find believable Zenodotus' reading according to which Agamemnon stands up to speak in front of only seven heroes (schol. Il. 2.55a: o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ grav fei "auta; r ej peÇ rJ ' hß gerqen oJ mhgerev eÍ t' ej gev nonto, / to∂si d' anistav menoÍ metev fh kreÇwn Âgamev mnwn." aj pÇqanon de; ej n eJ pta; oj rqo; n dhmhgore∂n). seem to go against human chronology are rejected on the same ground, as, for example, that Aethra, the maid of Helen, is to be identified with the mother of Theseus, who would have been extremely old by then (schol. Il. 3.144a):
A≥qrh, PitqhÅ oÍ qugav thr: e√ me; n th; n Qhsev wÍ lev gei mhtev ra aqethtev on: apÇqanon gav r ej stin ÔElev nhÍ amfÇpolon <eπnai> th; n ou § twÍ uÒ perarcaÇan, h ¶ n ouk ej kpoie∂ zhÅ n dia; to; mhÅ koÍ touÅ crov nou. e√ de; oJ mwnumÇa ej stÇ, kaqav per kaµ ej pµ pleiov nwn, duv natai mev nein. The criterion of believability plays a role even in the supernatural episodes where Aristarchus, like Aristotle, seems to put a limit to to; qaumastov n; thus within the microcosm of the epos, although the supernatural is allowed, believability still applies. For example, in poetry it is fine for an animal to speak, like Xanthus, the horse of Achilles. However, it is too much to have him speak like a learned man or a seer foretelling his destiny to Achilles, as happens at Iliad 19.416-17, lines that Aristarchus rejected (schol. Il.
Aethra

19.416-17a):
h § nper ej lafrotav thn <fav s' eß mmenai-damhÅ nai>: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi kaµ ou• toi o¥ duv o, o § ti . . . apÇqanon ªppon lev gein "fasÇn" w § sper aß ndra poluÇstora.
[we may be running together with the blows of Zephyrus] who they say is the lightest of all things; [yet still your destiny is] to be killed [in force by a god and a mortal]. . . . these two lines also are athetized because . . . it is unbelievable for a horse to say "they say, etc.," like a knowledgeable man. 24 Or, again, it is acceptable to have gods intervening in human affairs disguised as human beings. However, at Iliad 21.290, when Poseidon and Athena, disguised as two men, go to Achilles, it is not believable for Poseidon to say "Athena and I will help you," as Aristarchus remarked in schol. Il. 21.290a: aqete∂tai, o § ti apÇqanon e√Í andro; Í morfh; n wÒ moiwmev non lev gein "ej gø kaµ Palla; Í Âqhv nh": tÇÍ gav r ej stin, ou˚ mh; nohv s¬ ("it is athetized because it is not believable that disguised as a mortal he says 'Athena and I.' For Achilles will not understand who he is"). How could Achilles know that these two men were divinities? Erebus (cf. Od. 11.37, 150, 563) , and therefore could never have seen all these mythical examples of divine justice and wickedness being punished. 26 The scholia by Aristonicus bear witness to a long series of comments by Aristarchus along these lines: how can Minos come to the sacrificial blood? Does he go with all the people he is going to judge together with his throne (schol. HQT Od. 11.570: ouk aß ra uÒ pexhÅ lqen oJ MÇnwÍ ªna sunofq¬Å . aß logon ga; r to; kaµ su; n dikazomev noiÍ kaµ autåÅ dÇfrå ej xelqe∂n)? How can Orion hunt in Hades? How could he come forward with all the beasts that he has slain (schol. HT Od. 11.573: oude; ej pµ touv tou tethv rhtai to; suv mfwnon. aß logon ga; r to; ej n £Aidou kunhgete∂n: pΩÍ te a § ma t¬Å tΩn qhrΩn agev l¬ prohÅ lqe, kaµ dia; tÇ;)? How can Tityus come to the sacrifice, if he is lying on the ground with his liver devoured by two vultures (schol. QT Od. 11.577: katagev lasta kaµ tauÅ ta, e√ katestrwmev noÍ ej n tåÅ dapev då prohÅ lqen ej pµ to; sfav gion: auto; Í ga; r oJ ∆Odusseu; Í ouk hj duv nato diabhÅ nai ej pµ to; eß reboÍ)? Or how can Tantalus come to the sacrifice, together with the trees and the marshy lake in which he lies? Or how did Odysseus see what was within from outside (schol. H Od. 11.588: oude; ou• toÍ duv natai su; n lÇmn¬ kaµ dev ndroiÍ ej xelhluqev nai ej pµ to; sfav gion, h˙ pΩÍ eß xwqen ta; eß sw ej qe∫rei;)? Or how can Sisyphus, who must push the huge stone up a hill, come to the sacrifice (schol. QT Od. 11.593: pΩÍ duv natai su; n tåÅ lÇqå kaµ t¬Å akrwreÇç ej f' ¬• anekuv lie to; n lÇqon, h § kein ej pµ ta; sfav gia;)? All this, according to Aristarchus, was too much and the risk was that, instead of being astonishing, the episode became ridiculous (on which see pp. 298-99 below).
Aristarchus: Internal Contradictions
The conception of the work of poetry as a microcosm with its own rules leads to the principle of noncontradiction. Avoiding inconsistencies within the plot is a cardinal principle for Aristotle, who argues repeatedly against what is uÒ penantÇon (Poet. 1455a22-26): 27 de∂ de; tou; Í muv qouÍ sunistav nai kaµ t¬Å lev xei sunapergav zesqai o § ti mav lista pro; oj mmav twn tiqev menon: ou § tw ga; r aṅ ej nargev stata [oJ ] oJ rΩn w § ster par' auto∂Í gignov menoÍ to∂Í prattomev noiÍ euÒ rÇskoi to; prev pon kaµ h § kista aṅ lanqav noi [to; ] ta; uÒ penantÇa.
In constructing his plots and using diction to bring them to completion, [the poet] should put [the events] before his eyes as much as he can. In this way, seeing them very 25. On the criterion of to; aß logon applied to athetesis of repeated lines in Aristonicus' and exegetical scholia, see Lührs 1992, 167-94. 26. Schol. HT Od. 11.568: noqeuv etai mev cri touÅ "w ¶ Í e√pøn oJ me; n au® qiÍ eß du dov mon ◊AidoÍ e≥sw" (627), kaÇtoi ouk oß nteÍ agene∂Í perµ th; n frav sin. uÒ pe; r de; thÅ Í aqethv sewÍ autΩn lev getai toiav de: (H) pΩÍ oπde touv touÍ hṫ ou; Í loipou; Í eß sw tΩn £Aidou pulΩn oß ntaÍ kaµ tΩn potamΩn… 27. For Aristotle on uÒ penantÇon, cf. also Poet. Internal contradictions and inconsistencies are constantly rejected by Aristarchus too, who seems to have developed Aristotle's theory into a more complete system, where the philologist has to work on a text as a self-standing unity that must be purged of internal contradictions. Aristarchus takes exception to contradictions in the text (e.g., schol. Il. 8.39-40: ej nantiouÅ ntai de; ej nqav de to∂Í uÒ pokeimev noiÍ; schol. BQ Od. 12.374; schol. HQ Od. 12.439) and as a rule, when this happens, he is in favor of athetesis.
28 He also argues against Zenodotus for readings that are contrary to some data present in the poems. 29 The idea that something is consistent or inconsistent with the rest of the plot is expressed in Aristonicus' scholia with comments like sumf∫nwÍ ("in harmony," "in agreement with") or asumf∫nwÍ ("discordant," "in disagreement with"). Âsumf∫nwÍ is used to argue against readings and interpretations by Zenodotus or other colleagues that Aristarchus does not share because they contradict some other passage within the poem (schol. Il. 4.339b, 8.19 ). On the contrary, a line is sumf∫nwÍ with the rest of the poem when Aristarchus wants to defend Homer against his detractors or against the diaskeuastaÇ (schol. Il. 3.230a), or defend his own readings (schol. Il. 7.330b, 8.562 ). Alternatively, the same idea is expressed with mav contai/-etai ("they/it contradict[s]"), that is, that one or more lines are at odds (mav cetai/-ontai) with what has been said or known before, as in schol. H Od. 11.452: macov menoi to∂Í prokeimev noiÍ. For example, at Iliad 20.269-72, ancient scholars were puzzled that Aeneas' spear reaches the golden plate of Achilles' shield, having pierced the two external plates, one of bronze and the other of tin, as if the shield had the golden layer underneath, hidden by those of bronze and tin. Aristarchus solved the problem by athetizing the lines, because according to him these lines not only were odd in terms of content (why was the gold hidden by tin and bronze?), but, moreover, they were in clear contradiction with what we know about the shield of Achilles as described at Iliad 18.478-607, where its surface is clearly made of gold (schol. Il. 20.269-72a: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi tev ssareÍ, o § ti dieskeuasmev noi e√sµn uÒ pov tinoÍ tΩn boulomev nwn prov blhma poie∂n. mav cetai de; safΩÍ to∂Í gnhsÇoiÍ ["four lines are athetized because they were added by someone of those who want to create a question. For these lines are clearly in contradiction with those that are genuine"]).
On the other hand, in Aristonicus' scholia ou˚ mav cetai is used to solve a problem by showing that in Homer there are no internal contradictions. 30 One famous question (zhv thma) was that of how many times Hector and Achilles ran around Troy, because at Iliad 22.208 we read: all' o § te dh; to; tev tarton ej pµ krounou; Í afÇkonto ("but when for the fourth time they came to the springs"), whereas at Iliad 22.251 Hector says: "trµÍ perµ aß stu mev ga Priav mou dÇon" (" '[Achilles, I do not flee you anymore, as when before] I ran three times around the great city of Priam' "). Ancient scholars had taken [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] 11.767a, 19.407a, 21.570a, 5.807. 30. See schol. Il. 9.571a, 13.365a. exception to this passage, as Aristarchus noticed in schol. Il. 22.208a 2 : shmeiouÅ ntai dev tineÍ dia; to; dokouÅ n ej nantÇon eπnai "trµÍ perµ aß stu mev ga Priav mou dÇon" kaµ "all' o § te dh; to; tev tarton" ("some mark this line because of the apparent contradiction between 'I ran three times around the great city of Priam' and 'but when for the fourth time' "). Aristarchus, however, clarified and solved the problem by arguing that there were three full laps, but in the fourth they went as far as the fountain but did not go right around the city. Therefore there was no contradiction between the two lines (schol. Il. 22.251a: ou˚ mav cetai de; tåÅ "all' o § te dh; to; tev tarton" (Il. 22.208)· tre∂Í me; n ga; r teleÇouÍ kuv klouÍ periev dramon, to; de; tev tarton e § wÍ tΩn krounΩn ej lqov nteÍ oukev ti perihÅ lqon th; n pov lin ["it does not contradict 'but when for the fourth time' (Il. 22.208): for they ran in three full circles and in the fourth they arrived at the fountains and did not go around the city"]). 31
Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: HQH
At Poetics 1448a1-18, Aristotle states that every mimetic art represents hß qh, which can be either spouda∂oi, "serious," or fauÅ loi, "base." Poetry too, then, has to choose which hß qh are to be the target of mimesis, and hence it is divided according to the characters that it is going to imitate. In this regard, epic and tragedy are identical, in that both of them represent "admirable," "serious" people (Poet. 1449b9-10): hJ me; n ou® n ej popoiÇa t¬Å tragådÇç mev cri me; n touÅ meta; mev trou lov gå [em. Kassel: mev trou meta; lov gou B, mev trou megav lou A] mÇmhsiÍ eπnai spoudaÇwn hj kolouv qhsen.
Epic poetry follows tragedy insofar as it is a representation of serious people which uses speech in verse. (Trans. Janko 1987) Hence, what is valid for tragedy with regard to characters is to be considered valid for epos too. Characters of tragedy and epic must be spouda∂oi, "serious," and better than they are in reality. Hence they must not be caricatures of real people, as happens in comedy, because everything that is ridiculous is to be avoided in tragedy and epic. When Aristotle comes to a detailed account of tragic / epic characters (Poet., chap. 15), he first states that they must be crhstoÇ, "good," that is, "of value," aÒ rmov ttonteÍ, "appropriate," o § moioi, "(life)like," and oJ maloÇ, "consistent" (Poet. 1454a16-28): e ¶ n me; n kaµ prΩton, o § pwÍ crhsta; ¬® . e § xei de; h® qoÍ me; n ej a; n w § sper ej lev cqh poi¬Å fanero; n oJ lov goÍ h˙ hJ praÅ xiÍ proaÇresÇn tina <h § tiÍ aṅ> [add. Vahlen] ¬® , crhsto; n de; ej a; n crhsthv n. eß stin de; ej n eJ kav stå gev nei· kaµ ga; r gunhv ej stin crhsth; kaµ douÅ loÍ, kaÇtoi ge ≥swÍ touv twn to; me; n ce∂ron, to; de; o § lwÍ fauÅ lov n ej stin. deuv teron de; to; aJ rmov ttonta· eß stin ga; r andreÇan me; n to; h® qoÍ, all' ouc aÒ rmov tton gunaikµ ou § twÍ andreÇan h˙ deinh; n eπnai. trÇton de; to; o § moion. touÅ to ga; r e § teron touÅ crhsto; n to; h® qoÍ kaµ aÒ rmov tton poihÅ sai wÒ Í proeÇrhtai.
31. In analyzing plot, Aristotle deals also with the difference between simple and complex plots (Poet. 1452a12-18), which are characterized by the presence of anagnwrismov Í and peripev teia. These concepts are not present in Aristarchus, which is probably due to the fact that they are more part of a theoretical discussion of a literary work than concepts that could be used in his philological activity. For the same reason, Aristarchus does not seem to have taken much from Aristotle's sections on the different parts of tragedy (Poet. 1452b14-27) , and on the different kinds of actions (pitiful, fearful, recognitions, Poet. 1453b1-1454a15) . This essential difference between the work of Aristotle (theory) and that of Aristarchus (practice) is fundamental. tev tarton de; to; oJ malov n. kaṅ ga; r an∫malov Í tiÍ ¬® oJ th; n mÇmhsin parev cwn kaµ toiouÅ ton h® qoÍ uÒ poteq¬Å , o § mwÍ oJ malΩÍ an∫malon de∂ eπnai.
First and foremost, the characters should be good. [The tragedy] will have character if, as we said, the speech or the action makes obvious a decision of whatever sort; it will have a good character, if it makes obvious a good decision. [Good character] can exist in every class [of person]; for a woman can be good, and a slave can, although the first of these [classes] may be inferior and the second wholly worthless. Second, [they should be] appropriate. It is possible to be manly in character, but it is not appropriate for a woman to be so manly or clever. Third, [the character should be life-]like. This is different from making the character good and appropriate in the way already stated. Fourth, [the character should be] consistent. If the model for the representation is somebody inconsistent, and such a character is intended, even so it should be consistently inconsistent. (Trans. Janko 1987) If being crhstoÇ, "good," is a necessary characteristic, due to the essence of tragedy, which represents "serious" (spouda∂oi) actions and characters, the other three characteristics (to; aÒ rmov tton, to; o § moion, and to; oJ malov n) are more interesting to define. Characters must be aÒ rmov ttonteÍ, "appropriate," in the sense that each character must fit the characteristics of the kind of individual it represents. This concept is later on coupled with that of prev pon (Poet. 1454a28-31: eß stin de; parav deigma . . . touÅ de; aprepouÅ Í kaµ mh; aÒ rmov ttontoÍ o § te qrhÅ noÍ ∆Odussev wÍ ej n t¬Å Skuv ll¬. Cf. also Poet. 1458b14-15). Furthermore, characters must be o § moioi, "(life)like," "similar" to their real model (in "real life" or in the mythical tradition to which the poet refers).
32 Finally, they must be oJ maloÇ, "consistent," and not behaving in a contradictory way. The last three characteristics are thus sharply distinct. To; aÒ rmov tton refers to the relationship between the "type" the poet has in mind and how the character relates to it, so how "convincing" the representation of that particular human being is (considered in terms of gender, age, social status, etc.). To; o § moion instead refers to the relationship between reality outside the work of poetry (i.e., the real life or the mythical tradition in the background) and the characters, in the sense that the audience has to recognize the character as someone similar to and comparable to people from their own experience, whereas the idea of to; oJ malov n is an internal criterion to judge the development of the character within the poetical work. Aristotle then summarizes these criteria with the principle of kata; to; anagka∂on h˙ to; e√kov Í: when the poet portrays a character, as when putting the plot together, he has to aim at necessity and probability (Poet.1454a33-36):
crh; de; kaµ ej n to∂Í hß qesin oJ moÇwÍ w § sper kaµ ej n t¬Å tΩn pragmav twn sustav sei aeµ zhte∂n hṫ o; anagka∂on h˙ to; e√kov Í, w § ste to; n toiouÅ ton ta; toiauÅ ta lev gein h˙ prav ttein h˙ anagka∂on h˙ e√ko; Í kaµ touÅ to meta; touÅ to gÇnesqai h˙ anagka∂on h˙ e√kov Í.
In the characters too, exactly as in the structure of the incidents, [the poet] ought always to seek what is either necessary or probable, so that it is either necessary or probable that a person of such-and-such a sort say or do things of the same sort, and it is either necessary or probable that this [incident] happen after that one. (Trans. Janko 1987) 32. Cf. Janko 1987, 109 : "the character should be 'like,' literally; but like what? This means either that the type should be recognisable to us as one we know, i.e. lifelike, or that it should be like us. As there is no explanation or example, Aristotle must have regarded the meaning as obvious. . . . Clearly a character who is not lifelike will also be unlike ourselves, so the first explanation brings the second with it."
The analysis of characters plays a central role in the second book of the Rhetoric (Rh. 2.12-17.1388b31-1391b6), because the knowledge of different characters is essential for a good orator. Here Aristotle develops these ideas especially in the direction of what is typical of different ages. In three beautiful chapters (Rh. 2.12-14), where he is explaining how a good orator should depict various hß qh in order to be persuasive, Aristotle highlights the main characteristics of young people (rash, optimistic, generous), old people (prone to reflect, pessimistic, selfish) and mature people (a middle way between the two). If one wants to achieve a good mimesis, one cannot depict a character with the characteristic of another age, because this would go against the criterion of to; aÒ rmov tton. In this light the poet must be particularly careful when putting words into the mouths of his characters, because their lev xiÍ must be hj qikhv , consistent with the character that uses it, as Aristotle makes clear in the third book of the Rhetoric (1408a10-11):
to; de; prev pon e § xei hJ lev xiÍ, ej a; n ¬® paqhtikhv te kaµ hj qikh; kaµ to∂Í uÒ pokeimev noiÍ prav gmasin anav logon.
Your language will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and it corresponds to its subject. (Trans. Roberts 1984) This is because each age and class has its own mode of expression, and a good representation of a character must consider these characteristics (Rh. 1408a26-32):
. . . akolouqe∂ hJ aÒ rmov ttousa [i.e., de∂xiÍ] eJ kav stå gev nei kaµ e § xei. lev gw de; gev noÍ me; n kaq' hJ likÇan, o∏on pa∂Í h˙ anh; r h˙ gev rwn, kaµ gunh; h˙ anhv r, kaµ Lav kwn h˙ Qettalov Í, e § xeiÍ dev , kaq' a ¶ Í poiov Í tiÍ tåÅ bÇå: ou˚ ga; r kaq' a § pasan e § xin o¥ bÇoi poioÇ tineÍ. ej a; n ou® n kaµ ta; oj nov mata o√ke∂a lev g¬ t¬Å e § xei, poihv sei to; h® qoÍ: ou˚ ga; r tauta; oud' wÒ sauv twÍ agro∂koÍ aṅ kaµ pepaideumev noÍ e≥peien.
Each class of men, each type of disposition, will have its own appropriate way of letting the truth appear. Under "class" I include differences of age, as boy, man, or old man; of sex, as man or woman; of nationality, as Spartan or Thessalian. By "dispositions" I here mean those dispositions only which determine the character of a man's life, for it is not every disposition that does this. If, then, a speaker uses the very words which are in keeping with a particular disposition, he will reproduce the corresponding character; for a rustic and an educated man will not say the same things nor speak in the same way. (Trans. Roberts 1984) The interest in characterization in Homer is very well attested for Aristarchus too. In Iliad 1.117, when Agamemnon, angered by the response of Calchas, agrees to give Chryseis back and says, "I prefer that the army be safe rather than destroyed" (bouv lom' ej gø lao; n sΩn eß mmenai h˙ apolev sqai), Aristarchus rejected the athetesis of Zenodotus (according to whom the line was simplistic) by noticing (schol. Il. 1.117a) that ej n hß qei ga; r lev getai, that is, the line suits the character of Agamemnon (whom Aristarchus, probably, did not hold in great esteem). 33 33. Cf. also schol. Il. 15.505a, where Aristarchus notes that the line is according to Ajax' character (hj qikΩÍ); see also Didymus in schol. Il. 16.50a (ÂrÇstarcoÍ "e≥ tina oπda" dia; touÅ ei, A im b(BCE3E4)T ªn' ¬® hj qik∫teron). Aristarchus seems to have followed Aristotle in arguing for consistency and credibility of characters. Characters, according to Aristarchus, should behave according to appropriateness (to; aÒ rmov tton), decorum (to; prev pon), and what is fitting (to; o√ke∂on). In this case, as for Aristotle, aprephv Í becomes a synonym of ouc aÒ rmov ttwn, in the sense of "not convenient," "unsuitable" to the human type at issue. 34 This criterion actually embraces all the subtle distinctions of the Poetics as well as those of the Rhetoric: characters are aÒ rmov ttonteÍ if they behave as their social position, their status, their age, their present situation, or their "mythical model" require. Aristarchus thus denies "unheroic" words to Homeric heroes. It was unacceptable to have Agamemnon dwelling on the pleasure he was going to enjoy from Chryseis back in Argos (schol. Il. 1.29-31: aqetouÅ ntai, . . . aprepe; Í de; kaµ to; to; n Âga-mev mnona toiauÅ ta lev gein) or showing himself too greedy (schol. Il. 1.133-34 aqetouÅ ntai, o § ti . . . kaµ mh; aÒ rmov zonteÍ Âgamev mnoni). 35 The last words of Achilles to Patroclus as he is about to go to battle, in which Achilles wishes that every Trojan and every Greek may die so that only the two of them could survive and sack Troy, 36 were athetized by Aristarchus, because in his view they were not in line with Achilles' character (schol. Il. 16.97-100a):
aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi tev ssareÍ, diov ti kata; diaskeuh; n ej mfaÇnousi gegrav fqai uÒ pov tinoÍ tΩn nomizov ntwn ej raÅ n to; n Âcillev a touÅ Patrov klou: toiouÅ toi ga; r o¥ lov goi "pav nteÍ apov lointo plh; n hJ mΩn." kaµ oJ Âcilleu; Í ou˚ toiouÅ toÍ, sumpaqh; Í dev . Aristarchus also refuses to accept an Achilles who pettily insults Aeneas (schol. Il. 20.180-86a: aqetouÅ ntai . . . kaµ o¥ lov goi ou˚ prev ponteÍ tåÅ touÅ Âcillev wÍ pros∫på). Base insults to Diomedes are denied to Hector too (schol. Il. 8.164-66a: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi tre∂Í . . . anav rmosta de; kaµ ta; legov mena to∂Í pros∫poiÍ), a great hero who moreover, on another occasion, does not "hope," but rather "boasts," that is, "vaunts" that he will win (schol. Il. 14.366a: o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ grav fei "kaµ eß lpetai." aÒ rmov zei de; tåÅ pros∫på to; euß cetai, kaucaÅ tai ["because Zenodotus writes kaµ eß lpetai, but kaµ euß cetai, 'he vaunts,' is fitting to the character"]). Aristarchus also clearly deplores 34. This does not mean that, with the word aprephv Í, Aristarchus implied a moral judgment of poetry; however, I would not agree totally with Schenkeveld (1970, 167-68) , who maintains that aprephv Í in Aristarchean scholia is used only to point out a contradiction in the text. When it refers to characters, aprephv Í implies "contradiction" only in the sense of being contradictory to what a real individual in the same condition would have done; hence aprephv Í means "unfitting." On aprephv Í, see also n. 42 below.
35. See also Didymus in schol. Il. 4.345-46a: aprepΩÍ kaµ para; ta; prov swpa e√Í kreav dion oj neidÇzontoÍ touÅ Âgamev mnonoÍ.
36. Il. 16.97-100: ai˙ ga; r ZeuÅ te pav ter kaµ ÂqhnaÇh kaµ ◊Apollon / mhv tev tiÍ ou® n Tr∫wn qav naton fuv goi o § ssoi eß asi, / mhv tev tiÍ ÂrgeÇwn, nΩ∑n d' ej kduÅ men oß leqron, / oß fr' oπoi TroÇhÍ ¥era; krhv demna luv wmen ("I wish, O Zeus father and Athena and Apollo, that none of the Trojans, as many as they are, could escape death, nor any of the Argives, but that only the two of us could avoid destruction, so that we alone could loose the sacred veils of Troy").
Ajax' characterization as a miles gloriosus who brags of his military superiority : stÇcoi pev nte aqetouÅ ntai, o § ti ou˚ kata; to; n A≥anta o¥ lov goi kaµ eJ autåÅ anqupofev rei geloÇwÍ ["five lines are athetized because this speech is not worthy of Ajax and it is ridiculous that he replies to himself"]).
37 By the same token there are words that may suitably be said to kings and words that may suitably be said to subjects, like those that Odysseus speaks to the soldiers to keep them from going back home (Il. 2.203-6: "not all of us Achaeans are to be kings; the rule of many is not a good thing; let there be only one ruler, one king to whom the son of Cronos, crooked of counsel, has given the scepter and the laws in order that he can take counsel for them"). 38 According to Aristarchus these lines should not be employed by Odysseus when Odysseus is addressing the rank and file , but should instead be transferred to a previous point, when he is addressing the other leaders . His point of view is clear from Aristonicus' remark in schol. Il. 2.192a: e√sµ ga; r pro; Í basile∂Í aÒ rmov zonteÍ, ou˚ pro; Í dhmov taÍ ("for these lines are suitable to kings, not to rank soldiers").
The same holds for women, who must behave properly, not give orders to superior beings like gods, as in the case of Helen rebuking Aphrodite at Iliad 3.406-7 (schol. Il. 3.395: kaµ blav sfhma <kaµ> [add. Friedländer] para; to; prov swpov n ej sti ta; legov mena "h• so par' auto; n √ouÅ sa, qeΩn d' apov eipe keleuv qouÍ, / mhd' eß ti so∂si pov dessin" (Il. 3.406-7) ["and it is blasphemous even for the character [i.e., Helen] to say: 'Go and sit by his side, and give up the way of the gods, and [do not go back to Olympus] with your feet' "]; or, as in the case of Andromache, giving tactical advice to her husband, Hector, during their meeting (schol. Il. 6.433-39: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi eJ pta; e § wÍ touÅ (439) . . . o § ti anoÇkeioi o¥ lov goi t¬Å Ândromav c¬: antistrathge∂ ga; r tåÅ £Ektori ["seven lines are athetized down to line 439, because the arguments are not fitting for Andromache, since she is giving strategic advice instead of Hector"]. A young princess like Nausicaa was not allowed to dwell too much on the gossip people might have made upon seeing her enter the city with Odysseus (schol. Od. HQ 6.275: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi idu . . . wÒ Í anoÇkeioi tåÅ uÒ pokeimev nå pros∫på ["fourteen lines are athetized . . . because they are not fitting to the character in question"]. A mother like Thetis cannot give excessively explicit advice to her son (schol. 24.130-32a: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi tre∂Í, o § ti aprepe; Í mhtev ra u¥åÅ lev gein "agaqov n ej sti gunaikµ mÇsgesqai" (cf. lines 130-31) ["three lines are athetized because it is inappropriate for a mother to say to her son: 'it is good to have intercourse with a woman' "]).
As between men and women, there is a clear distinction between what is allowed to gods and to humans (schol. Il. 
39
The distinction between Greeks and barbarians and what was fitting for a Greek hero to say played an interesting role in the athetesis of Iliad 16.237. Here Achilles prays to Zeus and says: "you did me honor, and greatly oppressed the army of the Achaeans" (timhv saÍ me; n ej mev , mev ga d' ≥yao lao; n ÂcaiΩn). According to Aristarchus, the line was wrongly repeated from Iliad 1.454, where it was at the right place, when Chryses is praying to Apollo. For it was not likely for Achilles to rejoice at the defeat of the Greeks, whereas this was fitting for a barbarian enemy of the Greeks, like Chryses (schol. Il. 1.454: ou˚ ga; r e√kov twÍ Âcilleu; Í ej picaÇrei t¬Å h § tt¬ tΩn ÔEllhv nwn. oJ de; Cruv shÍ bav rbaroÍ kaµ misev llhn ["for it is not plausible for Achilles to rejoice at the defeat of the Achaeans, but Chryses is a barbarian and enemy of the Greeks"]). 40 The words of Aeneas to Achilles suggesting that they should not insult each other like women in the streets were athetized by Aristarchus for the same reasons, because they were more suitable to barbarians than to civilized 1 : aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi pev nte. . . . kaµ ta; legov mena anav xia tΩn pros∫pwn: kaµ para; barbav roiÍ dev , eß sti to; ta; Í guna∂kaÍ proercomev naÍ loidore∂sqai wÒ Í par' A√guptÇoiÍ ["five lines are athetized. . . . and what is said is unworthy of the characters. Among barbarians it is possible to have women come out and hurl abuse, as among the Egyptians"]).
41
An important point is that words and actions must be suitable to the age and the social level of the characters. A typical case is Iliad 3.156-60, when the old Trojans see Helen arriving on the tower and remark that it is shameful to fight for a woman, no matter how beautiful she is. The scene is introduced as follows (lines 154-55): oi ¶ d' wÒ Í ou® n e≥donq' ÔElev nhn ej pµ puv rgon √ouÅ san, / h® ka pro; Í allhv louÍ eß pea pterov ent' agov reuon ("and when they saw Helen arriving upon the tower, they softly spoke winged words to one another"). Aristarchus argued against a variant suggested by Zenodotus, ≈ka, "swiftly," instead of h® ka, "softly," "in a low tone," because that adverb was aprepev Í if it referred to Helen (a noble woman cannot come "quickly," "run": ej pµ puv rgon √ouÅ san ≈ka) and anav rmoston if it referred to the old Trojans (old men are bradulov goi, they cannot speak "swiftly": ≈ka pro; Í allhv louÍ eß pea pterov ent' agov reuon).
42 Similar to this case is that of Odyssey 15.45, 39. Cf. schol. Il. 8.420-24a. 40. Cf. also schol. Il. 16.237a. 41. Cf. Lührs 1992, 117-20, esp. 119. 42. Schol. Il. 3.155a : h® ka {pro; Í allhv louÍ}: o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ grav fei "w® ka." e≥te de; ej pµ thÅ Í ÔElev nhÍ ej stÇn, o § ti w® ka ej poreuv eto, aprepe; Í eß stai: e≥te ej pµ tΩn dhmogerov ntwn, o § ti w® ka dielev gonto, anav rmoston: bradulov goi gav r e√sin o¥ gev ronteÍ. This scholium raises, moreover, the question of a possible distinction between the meaning of aprepev Í and anav rmoston/ouc a § rmotton: whereas the first seems here to point to a specific appropriateness, related to the character Helen (running is not fitting to Helen), the latter seems to hint at a generic where Telemachus wakes up Pisistratus by touching him with his foot (la; x podµ kinhv saÍ). According to Aristarchus, this way of waking someone up is more suitable to Nestor, who is old and does it at Iliad 10.158 to wake up Diomedes. 43 These comments seem to have behind them the same ideas about old age as we read in the Rhetoric, Book 2.13, though, admittedly, Aristotle does not talk about the "slowness" and lack of strength of old people, but focuses on a psychological description. The same idea of old age as measured and never inclined to excess suggests that measured and dignified language is fitting to old kings like Priam 44 and Alcinous. 45 The reverse is true for young people, who should respect the old and restrain themselves from speaking too openly.
46 Also unfitting are references to marriage and family for warriors who are too young for it (schol. Il. 15.439a: πsa fÇloisi tokeuÅ sin: o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ grav fei "πsa fÇloisi tev kessin." ouc aÒ rmov zei de; tou; Í perµ to; n A≥anta nev ouÍ oß ntaÍ lev gein "tev kessin": prµn ga; r paidopoihÅ sai ej strateuvsanto ["because Zenodotus writes πsa fÇloisi tev kessin [we honour him] 'like our sons' [instead of πsa fÇloisi tokeuÅ sin, 'like our parents']. But it does not fit those around Ajax, who are young, to say 'like our sons.' They served in the army before begetting children"]).
A case where the contacts between Aristotelian theory and Aristarchus' practice are particularly strong and interesting is Odyssey 4.156-60. Here, Pisistratus speaks to Menelaus and confirms that Telemachus is Odysseus' son:
"Âtrei? dh Menev lae diotrefev Í, oß rcame laΩn, keÇnou mev n toi o § d' u¥o; Í ej thv tumon, wÒ Í agoreuv eiÍ: alla; saov frwn ej stÇ, nemessaÅ tai d' ej nµ qumåÅ w• d' ej lqøn to; prΩton ej pesbolÇaÍ anafaÇnein aß nta sev qen, touÅ nΩ∑ qeouÅ w ¶ Í terpov meq' aud¬Å ." Divine Menelaus, son of Atreus, leader of people, he is indeed that man's son, as you say. But he is prudent and feels shame in his heart that on his first coming he might show himself hasty in speaking in the presence of you, in whose voice we both take delight as in a god's.
43. Schol. HVind.133 Od. 15.45: noqeuv etai wÒ Í diapeplasmev noÍ ej x hJ misticÇou thÅ Í k ∆Iliav doÍ (line 158): ej ke∂ ga; r proshkov ntwÍ Nev stwr koim∫menon Diomhv dhn anÇsthsi, kuv yai katoknhv saÍ dia; to; ghÅ raÍ.
44. Schol. Il. 24.556-57: aqetouÅ ntai, o § ti anav rmostoi tåÅ pros∫på a¥ eucaµ kaµ ej pautov fwroÍ hJ uÒ pov krisiÍ. Cf. also Didymus at Il. 24.636a: <paus∫meqa:> ou § twÍ ÂrÇstarcoÍ antµ touÅ anapaus∫meqa: aprepe; Í ga; r to; lev gein to; n PrÇamon "tarp∫meqa."
45. Schol. P Od. 7.311: tou; Í e ¶ x ÂrÇstarcoÍ distav zei ÔOmhv rou eπnai. e√ de; kaµ ÔOmhrikoÇ, e√kov twÍ autou; Í periaireqhÅ naÇ fhsi. pΩÍ ga; r agnoΩn to; n aß ndra mnhsteuv etai autåÅ th; n qugatev ra kaµ ou˚ protrepov menoÍ, alla; liparΩn… Cf. also schol. Il. 9.56-57, about Nestor saying to Diomedes: "You might even be my son": o § ti ouc aÒ rmov zei tåÅ tre∂Í genea; Í bebiwkov ti lev gein "ej mo; Í aṅ pa∂Í e≥hÍ" (cf. line 57) kata; th; n hJ likÇan. pro; Í ej pitÇmhsin touÅ polev mou.
46. In this sense, one could quote the case of Od. 2.316-17, lines probably athetized by Aristarchus on the grounds that Telemachus here is threatening the suitors too strongly (schol. EM Od. 2.325: h® mav la] bebaiwtika; tauÅ ta ta; eß ph touÅ mh; e√rhÅ sqai uÒ po; Thlemav cou tou; Í prohqethmev nouÍ stÇcouÍ (lines 316-17) "peirhv sw w § Í k' uß mmi kaka; Í ej pµ khÅ raÍ √hv lw hj e; Puv lond' ej lqøn h˙ autouÅ tåÅ d' ej nµ dhv må." aporouÅ nteÍ ga; r lev gousin "h® mav la Thlev macoÍ," ouk aṅ aporhv santeÍ o¥ proakhkoov teÍ).
appropriateness, related to the characteristics of the human type depicted (speaking quickly is not fitting to old people in general). However, the evidence from the other scholia, which use the two terms inconsistently, prevents the acceptance of such conclusions.
Lines 158-60 were athetized by Aristarchus because they were considered contrary to the traditional usage (ta; pav tria) and not appropriate for the character of Pisistratus; moreover, they were superfluous and utterly unsuitable to be spoken by a young man (para; ta; pav tria kaµ ouc aJ rmov ttonta tåÅ Peisistrav tou pros∫på . . . perittoµ kaµ uÒ po; nev ou pantav pasi lev gesqai aprepe∂Í). This comment by Aristarchus finds a striking overlap with what Aristotle had stated in the Rhetoric (1395a2-6 and 1404b15-16): aÒ rmov ttei de; gnwmologe∂n hJ likÇç me; n presbutev rwn, perµ de; touv twn w• n eß mpeirov Í tÇÍ ej stin, w § ste to; me; n mh; thlikouÅ ton oß nta gnwmologe∂n aprepe; Í w § ster kaµ to; muqologe∂n, perµ de; w• n aß peiroÍ, hj lÇqion kaµ apaÇdeuton.
The use of maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced. For a young man to use them is-like telling storiesunbecoming; to use them in handling things in which one has no experience is silly and ill-bred. (Trans. Roberts 1984) ej peµ kaµ ej ntauÅ qa [i.e., in poetry], e√ douÅ loÍ kalliepo∂to h˙ lÇan nev oÍ, aprepev steron, hṗ erµ lÇan mikrΩn.
For even in poetry, it is not quite appropriate that fine language should be used by a slave or a very young man, or about very trivial subjects. (Trans. Roberts 1984) A young man cannot speak in gnΩmai either for Aristotle or for Aristarchus. By "reasoning," I mean the way in which they use speech to demonstrate something or indeed to make some general statement. (Trans. Janko 1987) eß sti de; kata; th; n diav noian tauÅ ta, o § sa uÒ po; touÅ lov gou de∂ paraskeuasqhÅ nai. mev rh de; touv twn tov te apodeiknuv nai kaµ to; luv ein kaµ to; pav qh paraskeuav zein (o∏on eß leon h˙ fov bon h˙ oj rgh; n kaµ o § sa toiauÅ ta) kaµ eß ti mev geqoÍ kaµ mikrov thtaÍ.
All [the effects] that have to be produced by speech fall under reasoning. The types of these are demonstration and refutation, the production of emotions (e.g., pity, terror, anger, etc.), and again [arguments about things'] importance or unimportance. (Trans. Janko 1987) Thus, with diav noia we are dealing with the content of speeches, either uttered by characters or by the poet himself when he intervenes in the narrative. In this sense it is opposed to lev xiÍ, which is the form in which the thought takes shape. In particular, Aristotle states that the two main parts of the diav noia are tov te apodeiknuv nai kaµ to; luv ein ("demonstration and refutation") and kaµ to; pav qh paraskeuav zein kaµ eß ti mev geqoÍ kaµ mikrov thtaÍ ("the 47. The attention toward characterization and what is fitting for each character is also used in the so-called luv seiÍ ej k touÅ pros∫pou, which are typical of Aristarchus' exegesis; on this principle, see Dachs 1913. production of emotions, and again importance or unimportance"). Aristotle in the Poetics does not treat diav noia extensively, but refers his readers to the Rhetoric, where the opposition between the thought-element versus the formal element in speeches is well stated (Rh. 1404a18-19): o¥ ga; r grafov menoi lov goi me∂zon √scuv ousi dia; th; n lev xin h˙ dia; th; n diav noian.
Speeches of the written kind owe more of their effect to their language than to their thought. (Trans. Roberts 1984) 48 The thought expressed by the characters or by the poet must thus reflect the general "ethos" of a poetic work. In particular, the diav noia of tragedy and epic must be in keeping with the "solemnity" (semnov thÍ) and seriousness that characterize both genres. Therefore, anything that is gelo∂on, "ridiculous," must be avoided, because this is typical of comedy and low genres and extraneous to tragedy and epic (Poet. 1449a32-37): hJ de; kwmådÇa ej stµn w § sper e≥pomen mÇmhsiÍ faulotev rwn mev n, ou˚ mev ntoi kata; paÅ san kakÇan, alla; touÅ a√scrouÅ ej sti to; gelo∂on mov rion. to; ga; r gelo∂ov n ej stin aJ mav rthmav ti kaµ aπscoÍ an∫dunon kaµ ou˚ fqartikov n, o∏on euqu; Í to; gelo∂on prov swpon a√scrov n ti kaµ diestrammev non aß neu oj duv hnÍ. Aristarchus certainly shared the idea that epic is mainly concerned with "serious" content, for he often rejects lines expressing a ridiculous thought. In particular, there are some interesting cases where Aristarchus argues against Homer himself. At Iliad 12.176, describing the battle at the Achaean wall, the poet says: "it would be too much toil for me, as if I were a god, to tell all this" (argalev on dev me tauÅ ta qeo; n w ¶ Í pav nt' agoreuÅ sai), a statement 48. A correspondence with this dichotomy between form (lev xiÍ) and thought (diav noia) can be found in the three books of the Rhetoric, where the first two deal with the thought, whereas Book 3 deals with the style. In particular, Book 1, where Aristotle analyzes the different kind of speeches and arguments, seems to correspond to the first part of diav noia ("proof and refutation"), while Book 2, dedicated to the analysis of the different emotions and characters that the good orator must imitate in order to persuade, reflects the second and third parts ("the arousing of feelings and then again exaggeration and depreciation"). Book 3, instead, is about the pezh; lev xiÍ, the prose style, extraneous to poetry. This is probably why in the Poetics Aristotle refers his readers to the Rhetoric as far as diav noia is concerned (the thought-element obeys the same rules both for prose and for poetry); whereas he needs to have a proper section on style in the Poetics (poihtikh; lev xiÍ is not the same as pezh; lev xiÍ). That this dichotomy of form vs. content is operating in Aristotle's Rhetoric is shown by the end of Book 2 (1403a34-1403b3): ej peµ de; trÇa eß stin a ¶ de∂ pragmateuqhÅ nai perµ to; n lov gon, uÒ pe; r me; n paradeigmav twn kaµ gnwmΩn kaµ ej nqumhmav twn kaµ o § lwÍ tΩn perµ th; n diav noian, o § qen te euporhv somen kaµ wÒ Í auta; luv somen, e√rhv sqw hJ m∂n tosauÅ ta, loipo; n de; dielqe∂n perµ lev xewÍ kaµ tav xewÍ ("Three points must be studied in making a speech and now we have completed the account of examples, maxims, enthymemes, and in general the thought-element-the way to invent and refute arguments. We have next to discuss language and arrangement," trans. Roberts 1984) .
49. On the opposition between gelo∂on (typical of comedy) and semnov n (typical of tragedy), cf. Rh. 1406b6-8: e√sµn ga; r kaµ metaforaµ aprepe∂Í, a¥ me; n dia; to; gelo∂on (crΩntai ga; r kaµ o¥ kwmådopoioµ metafora∂Í), a¥ de; dia; to; semno; n aß gan kaµ tragikov n ("Metaphors like other things may be inappropriate. Some are so because they are ridiculous (they are indeed used by comic poets too). Others are too grand and tragic," trans. Roberts 1984, modified) .
that Aristarchus rejected as gelo∂on.
50 For the same reason he found fault in the concluding line of the long catalogue of the Nereids mourning Patroclus (Il. 18.38-49). Here, after giving a list of thirty-three Nereids, the poet concludes: "and all the other Nereids that were in the depth of the sea" (aß llai q' ai ¶ kata; bev nqoÍ aJ lo; Í Nhrhi? deÍ h® san)-as if, Aristarchus commented, Homer first intended to list them all by name, but then got tired (schol. Il. 18.39-49: gelo∂ov n te ej x oj nov matoÍ proqev menon e√pe∂n pav saÍ, w § sper apokamov nta e√pe∂n "aß llai d'ai ¶ ktl."). Also, the consoling example of Niobe that Achilles tells to Priam is considered ridiculous, because a straightforward paraphrase of the exemplum would give: "eat, because Niobe too ate and then was turned into stone" (schol. Il. 24.614-17a: kaµ hJ paramuqÇa geloÇa: fav ge, ej peµ kaµ hJ Niov bh eß fage kaµ apeliq∫qh)-indeed a rather poor encouragement. 51 Aristarchus found fault also with the words uttered by the characters. For example, at Iliad 8.189 Hector talking to his horses and inviting them to drink was ridiculous: geloiov tatoÍ ej pµ ªppwn oJ stÇcoÍ, o § ti oπnon ªppoi oup Çnousi. kaµ o § ti "qumo; Í an∫goi e√Í mev qhn" gelo∂on. 52 Other atheteses by Aristarchus due to a gelo∂on thought in the words of characters are attested at Iliad 10.409-11 (Odysseus to Dolon);
53 Iliad 14.376-77 (Poseidon to the Greeks); Odyssey 4.158-60 (Pisistratus to Menelaus); Odyssey 4.553 (Menelaus to Proteus); Odyssey 11.157-59 (Anticlea to Odysseus); Odyssey 14.495 (Odysseus to the Greeks at Troy). Alternatively, Aristarchus notes something gelo∂on in the readings of predecessors (Zenodotus in particular), which are therefore to be rejected, at Iliad 3.74 (Paris to Hector) and Iliad 23.94 (Achilles to Patroclus' ghost).
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The simile comparing Achilles and Hector running around Troy to a dream in which the pursuer cannot reach the one who runs away at Iliad 22.199-201 (wÒ Í d' ej n oj neÇrå ou˚ duv natai feuv gonta di∫kein: / ouß t' aß r' o ¶ to; n duv natai uÒ pofeuv gein ouß q' o ¶ di∫kein: / w ¶ Í o ¶ to; n ou˚ duv nato mav ryai posÇn, oud' o ¶ Í aluv xai) was athetized by Aristarchus, as he found the lines "cheap" both in style and in thought : kaµ t¬Å kataskeu¬Å kaµ tåÅ nohv mati eutele∂Í.
55 Eutelhv Í, "cheap," "of no value," is thus used as a synonym of gelo∂oÍ in the scholia of Aristonicus to convey the idea that the content or the style of a passage are not consonant with the serious content of the epos. Aristotle likewise employs the adjective eutelhv Í when comparing two 50. Gelo∂on is surely part of the Aristarchean vocabulary since it appears in a direct quotation of Aristarchus by Didymus in schol. Il. 2.420a 1 . 51. Cf. also the first part of schol. Il. 24.614-17a: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi tev ssareÍ, o § ti ouk akov louqoi tåÅ "hJ d' aß ra sÇtou mnhv sat', <ej peµ kav me dav kru cev ousa>" (Il. 24.613)· e√ ga; r apeliq∫qh, pΩÍ sitÇa pro<s>hnev gkato… 52. Cf. Lührs 1992, 46 n. 92. 53 . On this athetesis, see Lührs 1992, 226-28. 54 . A rather close synonym of gelo∂on is euhv qhÍ, "foolish." Aristarchus athetized lines because of their "foolishness" in the thought expressed by the character: at Il. 1.139 (Agamemnon to Achilles); Il. 2.80-81 (in schol. Il. 2.76a, Nestor commenting on Agamemnon's dream); Il. 8.185 (hJ prosf∫nhsiÍ, i.e., the address of Hector to his own horses, euhv qhÍ). This criterion was also at the basis of an athetesis by Zenodotus in schol. Il. 1.117a (a scholium already mentioned): bouv lom' ej gø lao; n sov on: o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ auto; n hj qev thken wÒ Í thÅ Í dianoÇaÍ euhv qouÍ ouß shÍ. ou˚ de∂ de; auto; n √dÇç profev resqai, alla; sunav ptein to∂Í aß nw: ej n hß qei ga; r lev getai.
55. Though for different reasons, the dÇwxiÍ of Hector by Achilles in Il. 22 was problematic for Aristotle too (cf. Poet. 1460a11-18).
contrasting types of authors: the semnoÇ who will write tragedies and the eutele∂Í who will prefer comedies (Poet. 1448b25-27): o¥ me; n ga; r semnov teroi ta; Í kala; Í ej mimouÅ nto prav xeiÍ kaµ ta; Í tΩn toiouv twn, o¥ de; eutelev steroi ta; Í tΩn fauv lwn, prΩton yov gouÍ poiouÅ nteÍ w § sper e § teroi u § mnouÍ kaµ ej gk∫mia.
The grander people represented fine actions, i.e., those of fine persons, the more ordinary people represented those of inferior ones, at first composing invectives, just as the others composed hymns and praise-poems. (Trans. Janko 1987) Therefore, in Homer we must avoid everything that is eutelev Í. And indeed, we find many Aristarchean atheteses on the basis that some lines are eutele∂Í t¬Å sunqev sei kaµ t¬Å dianoÇç (schol. Il. On the other hand, the Aristotelian principle that epic diav noia is concerned with or must express importance (mev geqoÍ; cf. Poet. 1456a36-1456b2 quoted above) seems to be at the basis of Aristarchean practice too. Arguing against an athetesis of Zenodotus in Iliad 17.260, Aristarchus maintained that those lines containing a comment by the poet himself (tΩn d' aß llwn tÇÍ ken ¬• si fresµn ounov mat' e≥poi, / o § ssoi dh; metov pisqe mav chn hß geiran ÂcaiΩn; ["But of the rest, what man of his own wit could name the names of all that came after these and aroused the battle of the Achaeans?"] were actually increasing the importance (to; mev geqoÍ) of the battle for Patroclus' corpse (schol. Il. 17.260a: to; mev geqoÍ thÅ Í uÒ pe; r Patrov klou mav chÍ).
Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: LEXIS
The analysis of poihtikh; lev xiÍ is carried out by Aristotle (Poet. 1457b1-3) with reference to the oß noma: each word can be normal (kuv rion), a gloss (glΩtta), metaphorical (metaforav ), ornamental (kov smoÍ), invented (pepoihmev non), lengthened (ej pektetamev non), truncated (uÒ f¬rhmev non), or altered (ej xhllagmev non). Moreover, whereas the kuv rion usage is typical of the prose style, the other schemata are characteristic of poetic style. In particular, at Poetics 1459a9-10, glossai are said to be the most apt to epic; this, as already mentioned, is one of the points of contact between Aristotle and the work done at Alexandria, where collections of glossai were widely produced. However, poetic style cannot be reduced only to figures of speech; to be a good poet one has also to be clear (Poet. 1458a18-34):
lev xewÍ de; areth; safhÅ kaµ mh; tapeinh; n eπnai. safestav th me; n ou® n ej stin hJ ej k tΩn kurÇwn oj nomav twn, alla; tapeinhv : . . . semnh; de; kaµ ej xallav ttousa to; √diwtiko; n hJ to∂Í xeniko∂Í kecrhmev nh: xeniko; n de; lev gw glΩttan kaµ metafora; n kaµ ej pev ktasin kaµ paÅ n to; para; to; kuv rion. all' aß n tiÍ a § panta toiauÅ ta poihv s¬, h˙ a≥nigma eß stai h˙ barbarismov Í: aṅ me; n ou® n ej k metaforΩn, a≥nigma, ej a; n de; ej k glwttΩn, barbarismov Í. . . . de∂ aß ra kekraÅ sqaÇ pwÍ touv toiÍ. to; me; n ga; r to; mh; √diwtiko; n poihv sei mhde; tapeinov n, o∏on hJ glΩtta kaµ hJ metafora; kaµ oJ kov smoÍ kaµ ta® lla ta; e√rhmev na e≥dh, to; de; kuv rion th; n safhv neian.
56. On this athetesis, see Lührs 1992, 191 kinds] in some way. The first (i.e. the exotic name, metaphor, ornament and the other kinds we mentioned) will produce that which is not everyday and commonplace, and the standard name will produce clarity. (Trans. Janko 1987) To achieve clarity one must use "normal" words (kuv ria); however, this can lead to tapeinov thÍ, "meanness of style," which must be avoided in poetic style. Therefore poets also use words that get away from common language (ej xallav ttousa to; √diwtiko; n hJ to∂Í xeniko∂Í kecrhmev nh), for example, glossai and metaphors. However, they must not be excessive, otherwise the result will be an a≥nigma (if there are too many metaphors) or a barbarismov Í (if there are too many glossai). 57 The aim is thus to achieve an equilibrium between norm and novelty, where the true poet is able to mix the two and thus be at the same time both clear and striking.
Attention to both form and style is evident in Aristarchus; in particular, the definition of what is Homeric style and what is not seems to be the coherent development of the Aristotelian distinction between poetic and prosaic lev xiÍ.
58 As for Aristotle, for Aristarchus too language must first be safhv Í, "clear," and Homer is a champion of safhv neia: he always builds his sentences in the clearest way, e § neka safhneÇaÍ (cf. schol. Il. 15.8a). For this very reason, Aristarchus argued against Zenodotus at Iliad 14.169: eß nq' h § g' e√selqouÅ sa quv raÍ ej pev qhke faeinav Í ("And she [Hera] entered there [the chamber], closed the bright doors"), where Zenodotus changed the finite verb ej pev qhke into a participle ej piqe∂sa (so that the main verb was to be found in line 171, kav qhren). Homer-Aristarchus argued-prefers to have another main clause with a finite verb at line 169 and thus to be clear and avoid a postponed principal clause.
59
Aristotle in particular maintained that safhv neia was due to the usage of kuv ria oj nov mata, "standard names." It is interesting how many times Aristarchus notes that a term in Homer is used kurÇwÍ, that is, according to the normal usage, hence "clear."
60 On the other hand, Aristarchus seems to be well aware of the characteristic of poetic language, which is allowed to depart from kuv rion usage. Schol. Il. 5.266b describes as √dÇwÍ, that is, proper to Homer, the usage of the word poinhv in this passage (in the sense of "price paid," 57. For a similar analysis of prose style, see Rh. 1404b1-1408b20. 58. In this case, an important change in terminology happened, since for Aristarchus lev xiÍ meant "word" and not "diction," "utterance," "style," as in Aristotle; cf. Matthaios 1999, 198-200; 1996, 68-69 . To mean "diction," "composition of words" in Aristonicus' scholia we find suv nqesiÍ and kataskeuhv . 59. Schol. Il. 14.169a: quv raÍ ej pev qhke faeinav Í: o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ grav fei "quv raÍ ej piqe∂sa faeinav Í," ªna sunafh; Í oJ lov goÍ gev nhtai. oJ de; £OmhroÍ aß llaÍ arca; Í lambav nei, ªna mh; asafh; Í hJ perÇodoÍ gev nhtai hß toi uÒ steroperÇo-doÍ. On the concept of safhv neia in Homer, cf. also Didymus in schol. Il. 6.76b 1 and schol. Il. 8.349a 1 . 60. Cf. schol. Il. 4.141a, 7.146b, 7.255a, 10.75b, 11.523, 22.31, 22.319a, 22.489b . Aristarchus could not adopt the very word of Aristotle, kuv rion oß noma, which, by that time, meant something different, denoting the grammatical category of "proper names" (or just "names"), as opposed to that of epithets; see Matthaios 1996, esp. 69-70; 1999, 218-25. "recompense") and opposes it to the standard usage (kurÇwÍ) of the word, as at Iliad 9.636 (in the sense of a "fine paid by the slayer to the kinsmen of the slain"). 61 Sometimes when a word is used ou˚ kurÇwÍ the purpose is to give a deeper meaning, as at Iliad 2.670 where the image of Zeus pouring gold is said to be kurÇwÍ in Pindar (Ol. 7.34) and metaphoric in Homer to suggest the aboundance of gold (pro; Í eß mfasin touÅ plouv tou). Or the epithets argurov hlon "with silver nails," at Iliad 2.45, and crusov hlon, "with golden nails," at Iliad 11.29-30-both referring to the sword of Agamemnon-are not to be taken in the standard way (kurÇwÍ). Otherwise, Homer would contradict himself and depict Agamemnon's sword once as silver nailed, once as golden nailed. Rather, they are used ornamentally as a poetical device.
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Aristarchus is also keen to note metaphorical usages in Homer, as in schol. Il. 1.37e (kata; metafora; n ej k tΩn tetrapov dwn); schol. Il. 11.632b (kata; metafora; n apo; tΩn ej myuv cwn); schol. Il. 22.356a (apo; tΩn oß sswn hJ metaforav ). 63 Just as Aristotle allows poetic diction to depart from common language in order to avoid tapeinov thÍ, "meanness," so Aristarchus athetizes lines or rejects readings because the words (lev xeiÍ), the style (kataskeuhv ), or the composition (suv nqesiÍ) 64 are eutele∂Í, as happens in schol. Il. 2.314b (eutelh; Í de; hJ lev xiÍ); schol. Il. 8.164-66a (eutele∂Í e√si t¬Å kataskeu¬Å ); schol. Il. 10.497a (t¬Å sunqev sei eutelhv Í); schol. Il. 11.130a (eutele∂Í t¬Å kataskeu¬Å ); schol. Il. 11.413a (eutelh; Í gÇnetai hJ suv nqesiÍ); schol. Il. 11.767a 1 (eutelh; Í de; hJ suv nqesiÍ); schol. Il. 15.56a (kata; th; n suv nqesÇn e√sin eutele∂Í).
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However, notwithstanding this shift from common language, Homer never barbarÇzei. Hence, anything against grammatical correctness must be rejected, as in schol. Il. 12.34 (o § ti Zhnov dotoÍ grav fei "w ¶ Í hß mellon oß pisqe." eß sti de; bav rbaron) and in schol. Il. 15.716 (w § ste barbarÇzein to; n £Omhron), both against Zenodotus' readings.
Finally, some interesting parallels with the Rhetoric. For prose, one of the most serious vices is to be yucrov n, "frigid," and this can arise from four causes: the usage of glossai, of excessive epithets, of strange compounds, and of improper metaphors, all devices that pertain to poetry rather than prose (Rh. 1405b35-1406a13): ta; de; yucra; ej n tev ttarsi gÇgnetai kata; th; n lev xin, eß n te to∂Í diplo∂Í oj nov masin, . . . pav nta tauÅ ta ga; r poihtika; dia; th; n dÇplwsin faÇnetai. mÇa me; n ou® n au § th a√tÇa, mÇa de; to; crhÅ sqai gl∫ttaiÍ, . . . trÇton d' ej n to∂Í ej piqev toiÍ to; h˙ makro∂Í h˙ akaÇroiÍ h˙ pukno∂Í crhÅ sqai: ej n me; n ga; r poihv sei prev pei "gav la leuko; n" e√pe∂n, ej n de; lov gå ta; me; n aprepev stera.
Frigidities in language may take any of four forms: the misuse of compound words, . . . The way all these words are compounded makes them, we feel, fit for verse only. This, then, is one form in which bad taste is shown. Another is the employment of strange 61. Schol. Il. 5.266b: poinh; n <-ou § nek'>: o § ti √dÇwÍ tåÅ poinhv kev crhtai: kurÇwÍ ga; r ej pµ fov nou, "poinh; n dexamev nå" (Il. 9.636). . . . Similarly, the distinction between a usage kurÇwÍ and a usage that is not standard is noted by Aristarchus in schol. Il. 8.439a and schol. Il. 10.528b. 62. Cf. schol. Il. 2.45a. 63. Cf. also schol. Il. 1.51c, 2.49b, 4.521a, 5.21b, 5.299a, 11.390a, 13.147a, 13.317, 13.420, 13.745-46a, 23.226c, 23.273a . On the expressions kurÇwÍ, akuv rwÍ, and metaforikΩÍ, cf. Matthaios 1996, 66, with n. 44. 64. In particular, on suv nqesiÍ as a technical term, see Schironi, in Bottai and Schironi 1997, 1058-62. 65 . On the athetesis of Il. 15.56, see Lührs 1992, 129-32 . The word eutelhv Í is used by Aristotle (Poet. 1458b19-22) as a negative term to compare two different results in composing iambi: a good one by Aeschylus and a bad one by Euripides. words. . . . A third form is the use of long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets. It is appropriate enough for a poet to talk of "white milk," but in prose such epithets are sometimes lacking in appropriateness. (Trans. Roberts 1984) In Aristarchus, we find the same principle applied to poetry, which must avoid too many prose elements: some atheteses are due to the style, which is pezov Í, "prosaic" (schol. Il. 2.252a: aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi pev nte, o § ti pezov teroi t¬Å sunqev sei).
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On the other hand, Aristarchus, like Aristotle, takes exception to epithets "out of place" (ej pÇqeta aß kaira). 67 In this case, he seems to have applied Aristotle's principles to poetic style, because sometimes he rejects a line because the epithet there is aß kairoÍ. This happens at Iliad 21.331, when Hera, addressing her son Hephaestus, calls him kullopodÇwn, "club-footed" (schol. Il. 21.331a: aß kairon to; ej pÇqeton: hJ ga; r filanqrwpeuomev nh kaµ lev gousa "ej mo; n tev koÍ" ouk wß feilen apo; touÅ ej latt∫matoÍ prosfwne∂n ["the epithet is out of place. For since she regularly shows kindness and says 'my child,' she ought not to have addressed him by mentioning his defect"]), or at Iliad 21.218, when the Scamander, talking to Achilles, calls his streams ej rateinav , "pleasant" (schol. Il. 21.218a: o § ti aß kairon to; ej pÇqeton: pefoÇniktai ga; r uÒ po; touÅ aªmatoÍ ["because the epithet is out of place: for [the river] is red with blood"]). Iliad 23.581 was athetized because Menelaus, angry with Antilochus, address him as diotrefev Í (schol. Il. 23.581a: aqete∂tai, o § ti akaÇrwÍ lev gei diotrefev Í, oj rgizov menoÍ autåÅ ["it is athetized because he says 'fostered of Zeus' inappositely, since he is angry with him"]). Often Aristarchus finds that the epithet d∂oÍ, "divine," is used akaÇrwÍ: for example, when Menelaus addresses his enemy Paris (schol. Il. 3.352a: aqete∂tai, o § ti . . . kaµ "d∂on" akaÇrwÍ oJ Menev laoÍ to; n ej cqro; n lev gei ["The line is athetized because . . . and Menelaus calls his enemy 'divine' inappositely"]), or for the voluptuous Anteia (schol. Il. 6.160a), or for Hector when he is talking to himself (schol. Il. 7.75a 1 ). Aristarchus' principle is that epithets must be aÒ rmov ttonta, "fitting," to the names and contexts to which they refer, just as Aristotle explains (Rh. 1405a10-13): de∂ de; kaµ ta; ej pÇqeta kaµ ta; Í metafora; Í aJ rmottouv saÍ lev gein. touÅ to d' eß stai ej k touÅ anavlogon: e√ de; mhv , aprepe; Í fane∂tai dia; to; par' aß llhla ta; ej nantÇa mav lista faÇnesqai.
Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side. (Trans. Roberts 1984) If instead ej pÇqeta are not aÒ rmov ttonta the result is aprepev Í; this leads Aristarchus to an athetesis. 68 66. Cf. also schol. Il. 3.432 (aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi pev nte, o § ti pezov teroÇ e√si kaµ to∂Í nohv masi yucroµ kaµ akatav llhloi); schol. Il. 9.688-92a (aqetouÅ ntai stÇcoi pev nte . . . , o § ti . . . to∂Í nohv masi kaµ t¬Å sunqev sei pezov teroi); schol. Il. 11.767a 1 (aqetouÅ ntai de; apo; touv tou stÇcoi ej nneakaÇdeka, . . . o § ti hJ suv nqesiÍ autΩn pezhv ).
67. Cf. also Rh. 1408b1-2: to; d' eukaÇrwÍ h˙ mh; eukaÇrwÍ crhÅ sqai koino; n aÒ pav ntwn tΩn e√dΩn ej stin ("all the variations of oratorial style are capable of being used in season or out of season," trans. Roberts 1984) .
68. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 237-38. 7. Aristotle, Aristarchus, and the Hellenistic Literary Criticism
The parallels between Aristotle's theoretical statements in the Poetics and in the Rhetoric and Aristarchus' practice in his eß kdosiÍ of Homer must not be taken, however, as evidence of a "direct" dependence of Aristarchus on Aristotle. Aristarchus is not a Peripatetic, or, better, is only a Peripatetic to the extent that the other scholars and scientists working at the Museum or in Alexandria were Peripatetic. Aristotle seems to have shaped their rigorous and systematic approach to knowledge, also providing them with a set of methodological tools to proceed in their studies, such as the principle of cause and effect, analogical reasoning, the combination of teleological and mechanistic views of natural phenomena, and the analysis of concrete data in order to offer a systematic view of the kosmos. 69 This is what, mutatis mutandis, we find in Aristarchus, who, among the "philologists" of his own time, such as Crates of Mallos and the so-called kritikoÇ, is certainly the most concrete, systematic, and anti-speculative. This is an important point, because all of these similarities between Aristotle, Aristarchus and, in general, the Alexandrian philological school 70 in the field of literary criticism are not particularly meaningful if it cannot be demonstrated at the same time that this is a unique case and that the majority of the other contemporary grammarians, philologists, and critics were adopting other views. It is thus necessary to focus on Aristarchus' colleagues.
One of the most important sources for Hellenistic poetic theories is On Poems by Philodemus of Gadara. In Books 1 and 2, Philodemus, using Crates' work surveying the literary views of the "critics" and of the "philosophers," attacks the views of the so-called kritikoÇ.
71 Then in Book 5 (cols. 29-39 Mangoni), based on the previous work of his teacher Zeno of Sidon, he surveys thirteen different views of poetry.
72 Unfortunately, these two accounts are not completely consistent with each other and, moreover, it is not always easy to judge who held particular views. However, some general points and a certain degree of detail for some of these critics and literary theorists can be reached. A brief review of them will show how Aristarchus' approach to poetry is different from (and more Aristotelian than) all these other theories.
7.1 The kritikoÇ (Heracleodorus, Pausimachus, and the Others) and Crates
The term kritikov Í, as Janko has pointed out, is in itself very ambiguous because by the time of Philodemus it meant generically "literary critic." 73 How-69. The same relationship with Aristotle can be envisaged for Erasistratus; cf. von Staden 1997. 70 . I am focusing on Aristarchus because among the Alexandrians he is the one about whom we know most and also he is considered the acme of Alexandrian philological activity. However, Zenodotus, Eratosthenes, and Aristophanes of Byzantium share, at least in part, the same Aristotelian approach with Aristarchus. On Zenodotus, see Nickau 1977, 132-83 ; on Eratosthenes, see p. 309 below. The contrast thus is between the Alexandrian school (with Aristarchus as the main and final representative of it) and the other schools flourishing in other parts of the Hellenistic world, like Pergamum and Athens.
71. The best survey of these views is that by Janko (2000, 120-89 Janko 2000, 124-25) 75 According to these critics, then, the content, the thought-element, and the words, were something outside poetry, and the poets must only take care of the form and verbal composition. The extraneousness of thoughts and diction from the tev cnh poihtikhv was thus the common ground and the shared basic principle of all the kritikoÇ. There were, however, some differences in the details. Heracleodorus (late third century b.c.e.) 76 maintained that only euphony that supervenes upon word-order (suv nqesiÍ) mattered, whereas genre, style, and meter had nothing to do with poetry. 77 In fact, according to him, even content was superflous: if the line sounded good, it did not matter if the verse was unintelligible.
78 Similar but more extreme views were held by Pausimachus of Miletus (c. 200 b.c.e.) , 79 who considered sound the only source of poetic pleasure (that is, the sounds of vowels in particular), and denied a role to content, genre, and even to the choice (ej kloghv ) of words. The first three views quoted in Zeno's list of Book 5 are along these lines: the first group calls for a "composition that delights the hearing or moves along beautifully and expresses the thought powerfully"; the second for a "verbal composition that signifies the underlying thought vividly and suggestively," and the third for a "composition that makes clear the underlying thought clearly and concisely along with preserving a poetic style." 80 All these views focus on the verbal composition (suv nqesiÍ), which is presented as the main task of a poet. The thought (diav noia) is indeed there but its role is secondary; it is necessary only in the sense that poetry, qua poetry, must express something.
A particular case is represented by Crates, quoted by Philodemus among the kritikoÇ and considered the rival of Aristarchus in Homeric criticism. The assessment of the real nature of this opposition is still under debate. If, on the one hand, it is undeniable that Crates was in many respects pursuing a different kind of scholarship, more interested in the philosophical aspects of the text and in its allegorical meaning (especially in the light of Stoic cosmology), on the other hand the methodology he uses (etymology, attention to Homeric style, grammatical analysis, and even analogy) is largely shared 74. On the kritikoÇ, see Porter 1995 . 75. Cf. also Asmis 1992a , 142. 76. On Heracleodorus, see Janko 2000 , 155-65. 77. Janko 2000 , 162, frag. 29. 78. Janko 2000 , 161, frag. 22. 79. On Pausimachus, see Janko 2000 , 165-89. 80. Asmis (1992b thinks that the first opinion is Crates' (on Crates, see below).
with the Alexandrians. Yet the similarity of methods used by these two schools highlights better their fundamentally different approaches to the topic, for there are frequent cases where Crates and Aristarchus use the same procedure (etymological analysis or even analogy) to reach opposite results.
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This fundamental difference between Aristarchus (a grammatikov Í, dealing mostly if not only with the text) and Crates (a kritikov Í, with a pronounced "philosophical" approach to Homer) was already recognized by Crates himself, who proudly maintained that he was able to "judge" a poem, unlike the grammarians concerned only with the limited analysis of words, syntax, and questions of authenticity (Sext. Emp. Math. 1.79): kaµ ga; r ej ke∂noÍ [i.e., Krav thÍ] eß lege diafev rein to; n kritiko; n touÅ grammatikouÅ , kaµ to; n me; n kritiko; n pav shÍ, fhsÇ, de∂ logikhÅ Í ej pisthv mhÍ eß mpeiron eπnai, to; n de; grammatiko; n aÒ plΩÍ glwssΩn ej xhghtiko; n kaµ prosådÇaÍ apodotiko; n kaµ tΩn touv toiÍ paraplhsÇwn e√dhv mona: paro; kaµ ej oikev nai ej ke∂non me; n arcitev ktoni, to; n de; grammatiko; n uÒ phrev t¬.
[Crates] said that the "critic" was better than the grammarian and that while the critic was experienced in all of logical science, the grammarian was simply an interpeter of rare words (glossai), establisher of accents, and knower of things like these; hence the critic was like an architect and the grammarian like his servant. (Trans. Blank 1998) As to the claim that one must judge neither what is delightful to perception nor the thought of poems, but [one must] judge through perception the rational theorems that exist by nature, not without thoughts-not, however, the thoughts, . . . (Trans. Asmis 1992a, 155) From these fragments, a major point in Crates' literary views emerges clearly. 83 As for the kritikoÇ, for Crates too hearing alone can judge whether a poem is good or not. However, for Crates the judgment of euphony is not 81. On Crates and Stoicism, cf. Broggiato 2001, xxxi-xxxiii, lii, lvii-lviii, lx-lxi, lxiv-lxv; and Asmis 1992a, 139-40, 156-57, 161. 82. Cf. Blank 1998, 140-41; see also Broggiato 2001, 249-50 (on frag. 94) . 83. See also Janko 2000, 122-23, esp. V 7, V 8, V 11. subjective, but happens on the basis of objective criteria that are recognized by the hearing. Also, whereas Heracleodorus and Pausimachus did not take the content into consideration at all, Crates allows for it, in the sense that content is embedded in poetry. However content (diav noia, ta; noouv mena) is not the object of judgment. 84 For diav noia is a nontechnical (aß tecnon) part of poetry.
85
In sum, the constant and sole focus on suv nqesiÍ and eufwnÇa 86 as the only criteria to judge poetry, on the one hand, and the firm point that content and argument are outside the art, on the other, mark all these views as not Aristotelian 87 and also not Aristarchean. As we have seen, Aristarchus very often opposes (or couples) form (suv nqesiÍ or kataskeuhv ) and thought (diav noia or nov hma), as if they were the constitutive and polar parts of poetry, especially when giving reasons for an athetesis. If one decides on a line on the basis of the form or the thought-element (or both), obviously he considers these two elements as fundamental (and also technical) parts of the poetry, as did Aristotle. This is exactly what Crates and the kritikoÇ were arguing against.
It is moreover interesting to note that the vocabulary adopted by the kritikoÇ and Crates is identical to that we find in Aristonicus' scholia, with terms like diav noia, nohv mata, and suv nqesiÍ.
88 This means that we are dealing with technical terminology that indeed started first with the Peripatos and was fully developed during Hellenistic times and still used in the first century b.c.e. However, within this common terminology, the principles are radically different: for the critics and Crates, diav noia is not part of poetry, and sound alone (either as verbal composition, suv nqesiÍ, or as pure euphony) is the sole criterion by which to judge poetry. For Aristotle and Aristarchus the thought (diav noia)-but we could speak more generally of content, including thus also the muÅ qoÍ and the hß qh-is at the core of poetry.
Zeno's List: Theories on Diction (suv nqesiÍ)
There is, however, more. In the list of Zeno, a second group of critics maintains that (Book 5, the main point of a poem is a suv nqesiÍ lev xewÍ ej nargΩÍ kaµ ej mfatikΩÍ th; n uÒ potetagmev nhn diav noian shmaÇnousa ("a composition expressing the underlying thought vividly [ej nargΩÍ] and suggestively [ej mfatikΩÍ]"). 89 In rhetorical handbooks, ej nav rgeia and 84. Cf. Asmis 1992a, 160: "Crates does not take the extremely radical position that what makes a poem good is simply the sound, considered apart from any meaning. . . . His point, which is radical enough, is that what makes a poem good is the sound in relation to the meaning, regardless of what the meaning is." 85. Cf. Porter 1995, 93-99. 86 . The theory of euphony stemmed from Pythagoras and the atomists and then was developed by the Stoics. Aristotle and the Alexandrians, however, rejected it; see Janko 2000, 173-82, 189. 87. Similar views are argued by Arrighetti (2001, 138-46) . 88. For a full list of this technical terminology, overlapping with the Aristotelian one, see Mangoni 1993, 79-103. 89. On this opinion, see Asmis 1992b, 401-3 . ∆EmfatikΩÍ is translated here with "suggestively," because eß mfasiÍ in ancient literary criticisms does not correspond to the modern "emphasis," but is a technical term that indicates the ability that a poet has to express something that is not clearly stated, as Asmis (1992b, 402) explains: "There is no good English equivalent; 'suggestive' comes close in meaning. Although the term can mean 'expressive' and this sense can slide off into 'forceful,' it is misleading to translate ej mfatikov Í as 'emphatic' or 'forceful,' as it is often done." I have thus preferred to leave the Greek term eß mfasiÍ instead of translating it into "suggestion," which may be equally confusing. eß mfasiÍ are considered among the best qualities of style; 90 this is in contrast with Aristotle, who maintains that the major virtue of style (both in prose and in poetry) is safhv neia. 91 We have seen that Aristarchus most highly praises safhv neia while also esteeming suntomÇa.
92 True, Aristarchus pays some attention to Homer's ability to achieve auß xhsiÍ and eß mfasiÍ, 93 but this is something that Aristotle as well admires in Homer (Rh. 1413b32-1414a7): oJ ga; r suv ndesmoÍ e ¶ n poie∂ ta; pollav , w § ste ej a; n ej xaireq¬Å , dhÅ lon o § ti tounantÇon eß stai to; e ¶ n pollav . eß cei ou® n auß xhsin: . . . touÅ to de; bouv letai poie∂n kaµ £OmhroÍ ej n tåÅ "Nireu; Í au® Suv mhqen," "Nireu; Í Âglai? hÍ," "Nireu; Í o ¶ Í kav llistoÍ." perµ ou• ga; r polla; lev getai, anav gkh kaµ pollav kiÍ e√rhÅ sqai: e√ ou® n [kaµ] pollav kiÍ, kaµ polla; doke∂, w § ste huß xhken, a § pax mnhsqeÇÍ, dia; to; n paralogismov n, kaµ mnhv mhn pepoÇhken, oudamouÅ u § steron autouÅ lov gon poihsav menoÍ.
Just as the use of conjunctions makes many statements into a single one, so the omission of conjunctions acts in the reverse way and makes a single one into many. It thus makes everything more important. . . . This is the effect which Homer seeks when he writes "Nireus likewise from Syme, Nireus the son of Aglaia, Nireus, the comeliest man." If many things are said about a man, his name must be mentioned many times; and therefore people think that, if his name is mentioned many times, many things have been said about him. So that Homer, by means of this illusion, has made a great deal of Nireus, though he has mentioned him only in this one passage, and he has preserved his memory, though he nowhere says a word about him afterwards. (Trans. Roberts 1984) It is interesting to note that the criterion of the ej nargev Í seems to be absent from the scholia by Aristonicus. 94 Moreover, the fact that those critics praised only the "excessive" qualities leading to amplification and eß mfasiÍ and did not pay any attention to clarity separates them from Aristotle and Aristarchus. 95 The third opinion, instead, demands only clarity and conciseness (Book 5, col. 31.7-8b Mangoni: suv nqesiÍ safΩÍ kaµ suntov mwÍ <th; n uJ potetasmev nhn diav noian diasafouÅ sa>); this too is not in line with Aristarchus, who recognized that Homer had a particular poetic manner of expression, for example with glossai, metaphors, and other figures of speech. 91. On Aristotle's virtues of diction, see Ax (1993, esp. 27-31) , who outlines the virtues of diction among Peripatetics and Stoics as follows: for Aristotle they are safev Í, eJ llhnÇzein, prev pon; for Theophrastus: ÔEllhnismov Í, safhv neia, prev pon, kataskeuhv ; and for the Stoics: ÔEllhnismov Í, safhv neia, suntomÇa, prev pon, kataskeuhv (see Diog. Laert. 7.59).
92. Cf. schol. Il. 1.110a, 3.352a, 8.108a, 8.528 . 93. Cf. schol. Il. 2.299b, 2.670 (quoted above, for the distinction between kurÇwÍ usage and the metaphorical one), 2. 809, 3.80b, 6.169a, 8.108a, 9.44a, 15.470a, 15.622, 16.161a, 17.172, 23.16a, 24.6-9a 1 , 24.205b 1 ; cf. also Didymus in schol. Il. 19.386a. In another instance (schol. Il. 9.14b) Aristarchus was arguing that lines 15-16 of Book 9 of the Iliad, where Agamemnon is weeping "like a fountain of dark water that pours down murky water from a steep cliff " and that Zenodotus rejected, were instead anagka∂a dev . . . e√Í auß xhsin, i.e., for the amplification of the tragic character of the moment.
94. Out of forty-nine occurrences in the Iliad and Odyssey scholia of the words ej nav rgeia, ej nargev Í, and ej nargΩÍ, none goes back to Aristarchus. See also Zanker (1981, 307-8) , who maintains that ej nav rgeia is never used by Aristotle, but that he uses ej narghv Í in Poet. 1455a24 and so does Theophrastus. However, this is an Epicurean concept (ibid., 309-10).
95. According to Asmis (1992b, 405-6) , the recognition that eß mfasiÍ is the most important constituent of poetry leads to the adoption by Hellenistic scholars of allegorical reading, a way of reading poetry that was totally rejected by Aristarchus. Mangoni) useful thought (wfev limoÍ diav noia). All these definitions are equally extraneous to Aristarchus, who never defines Homeric poetry as "useful" or remarks on the sofÇa of the poet. This can be seen in conjunction with the idea that Homer does not aim at didaskalÇa but at yucagwgÇa, a statement ascribed to Eratosthenes, who maintained that in Homer one should not look for any technical knowledge, geography in primis. 97 This idea was shared by Aristarchus as well, and many are the scholia where, commenting on Homeric geography, Aristarchus claims that we do not have to seek for accuracy, or a true depiction of the cosmos. 98 Then (col. 33.1-3 Mangoni) Philodemus mentions the opinion of those who call for a composition able to teach "something more" (suv nqesin lev xewn prosdidav skousav n ti perittov teron dia; poihv matoÍ). This statement is very interesting when compared with Aristarchean evidence, and not only because again it calls for a didactic aim in poetry. More importantly, perissov Í and its derivatives are some of the most typical expressions to be found in the scholia of Aristonicus, but they are always used in a negative sense, meaning "superfluous." Everything that is perissov n is rejected in Homer. Often this criterion is the deciding ground for an athetesis.
99 This is a very interesting point because the negative sense for perissov Í (in itself a vox media, signifying "extraordinary" but also "superfluous," "useless") is shared with (poihthv Í), the poem (poÇhma), and poesy (poÇhsiÍ). The second and third parts correspond to form (suv nqesiÍ or poÇhma) and content (uÒ pov qesiÍ or poÇhsiÍ). This opposition suv nqesiÍ/uÒ pov qesiÍ as outlined by Neoptolemus (he himself seems to have used these terms together with poÇhma and poÇhsiÍ) is stated in Book 5 (col. 14.26-28 Mangoni): The technical terminology is the usual one; however, a link between Neoptolemus and the Alexandrians can be seen in the opposition between form and content as expressed with suv nqesiÍ / uÒ pov qesiÍ. We have already mentioned the vast usage of the term suv nqesiÍ to indicate "composition," "style," among the Alexandrians. This terminology is actually missing in Aristotle who, as was observed, used instead lev xiÍ to indicate "form" and "style." It seems as if the usage of suv nqesiÍ for "form" (in opposition, even from a morphological point of view, to uÒ pov qesiÍ for the "content") is a later development, which might have been due to Neoptolemus himself. 107 This Peripatetic scholar, like Aristotle and Demetrius of Phalerum before him, was known at Alexandria 108 and exercised some sort of influence among the grammatikoÇ there. While in the scholia derived from Aristarchus there seems to be no trace of the opposition suv nqesiÍ / uÒ pov qesiÍ as formulated by Neoptolemus, the use of the word uÒ pov qesiÍ to indicate the "content" of a literary work comes from Aristophanes of Byzantium, who used the term to refer to the summaries of the "content" of the dramas. However, apart from this idea of poetry as based on form and content, the tripartite division of poetry as devised by Neoptolemus is absent in Aristarchus as well as in Aristotle. 109 Also different is the idea that the poets, according to Neoptolemus, should both delight and benefit, a criterion that seems closer to Plato than to Aristotle. 110 The importance of didaskalÇa as the goal of poetry had already been advocated by Heraclides of Pontus (fourth century b.c.e.), a pupil of Plato and Aristotle, 111 who, besides writing "grammatical" treatises on Homer and other poets in the best Aristotelian tradition, maintained, more in line with the euphonistic school, that ej mmev leia, "musicality" and ligurov thÍ, "sonority," were primary virtues for poets.
Andromenides (third century b.c.e.?) is perhaps the closest to Aristotle and Aristarchus. His case, like that of Heraclides, is interesting evidence of how the Hellenistic critics were influenced by many different doctrines.
Philodemus in Book 1 quotes him among the kritikoÇ; 112 however, he has many views in common with Neoptolemus of Parium. Like Neoptolemus and the Peripatetic tradition, he collected glosses. Moreover, he seems to follow the same division of poetics into poet (poihthv Í), poem (poÇhma), and poesy (poÇhsiÍ). He is more Aristotelian than Neoptolemus, however, when he maintains that poetry aims to please (and not to impart truth like prose) and when he holds the view that each genre has its own subject matter and appropriate style (to; prev pon) and that each character has a distinctive diction. On the other hand, Andromenides, like Crates, maintained that the ear was the ultimate judge of poetry (and this is why he is considered a kritikov Í by Philodemus), and also that diction and word choice (ej kloghv ) were paramount. This emphasis on phonetic beauty, not so prominent in Aristotle, is at the core of Theophrastus' theory of style 113 and can be seen as a later development of the Peripatetic school.
The case of Megaclides (early third century b.c.e.) is similar; he, while quoted by Philodemus in Book 1 among the kritikoÇ, is defined as a Peripatetic in other sources. 114 His work on Homer (he wrote a perµ ÔOmhv rou) and on his language (he believed that Homeric dialect was Attic, like Aristarchus) is purely in line with Alexandrian interests. Moreover, his distinction, especially in terms of mythological tradition, between Homer and Hesiod, on the one hand, and post-Homeric and post-Hesiodic poets, on the other, makes him an Aristotelian with ideas very close to those of Aristarchus. However, he was listed by Crates among the advocates of the ear (and not the intellect) as the best judge for poetry. And even if his precise poetical theories are still under debate, due to the fragmentary state of the evidence from On Poems 1, he seems to be close to Heraclides of Pontus and Andromenides, as Janko has concluded. 115 The euphonistic approach to literature shared by all these Peripatetic scholars makes them pupils more of Theophrastus, with his theory of style and of word choice (ej kloghv ), than of Aristotle, with his content-based approach to texts.
Conclusion
As I hope to have shown, Aristarchus seems to have been aware of Aristotelian reflections on poetry. In his work on Homer, he uses Aristotelian categories and critical concepts. This is particularly evident when Aristarchus has to deal with atheteses or argues against Zenodotus' readings. Interesting similarities between Aristotle and Aristarchus are to be found in the handling of the plot (it can contain "impossible elements," but they must be "according to necessity or probability"), of the characters (they are of necessity "serious" and their behavior must be according to what is considered "proper"), of the thought-element (epos is a serious genre, hence all the comic elements must 112. On Andromenides, see Janko 2000, 143-54. 113. Cf. Dion. Hal. Isoc. 3.1; and Ardizzoni 1953, 70-72. 114 . Frag. 2 Janko. On Megaclides, see Janko 2000 , 138-43. 115. Cf. Janko 2000 be avoided) and of style (which must be clear, but also poetic, i.e. rich in glosses and metaphors).
The affinity between Aristotle and Aristarchus is further proved by a comparison with other Hellenistic views on poetry. Here, while the technical vocabulary is almost identical, the views held by Crates or the other Hellenistic kritikoÇ are opposite or, at best, far in spirit from what was expressed by Aristotle. In particular, their continuous focus on the sound-element and euphony against content are in striking opposition to Aristotle's theory and Aristarchus' practice.
116
There is, however, a fundamental distinction between Aristotle and Aristarchus: whereas the philosopher theorizes these principles, the philologist applies them. In this, Aristarchus is different from colleagues like Crates and the kritikoÇ as well. The latter had an "active" philosophical background; they claimed to be critics because they aimed to give prescriptive views on how one should write a poem. Aristarchus does not claim anything like that, but tries to make a better text of Homer by editing and commenting on it. In this sense, Aristarchus (and his Alexandrian predecessors) are different from all the other scholars who were taken into account, who like Crates (and, in this view, Aristotle too) wanted to develop theories out of the study of Homer. For Aristarchus, Aristotelian philosophy, like grammatical categories, is, instead, just a tool to use in his job: working on texts, preparing editions and writing commentaries. The contrast could not be greater: on the one hand, literary critics like Crates and the other kritikoÇ, having a particular agenda, or, as in the case of Crates, influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, versus grammarians like Aristarchus, on the other. The latter had a "scientific approach" to the text, looking at the bare data on the basis of a very clear account: that of Aristotle, the founder of scientific inquiry.
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116. I am not arguing that Aristotelian concepts are present only in Aristarchean scholia. As Richardson (1980) has demonstrated, they are abundantly present in the exegetical scholia. For example, in schol. QV Od. 23.310-43 (ou˚ kalΩÍ hj qev thsen ÂrÇstarcoÍ tou; Í tre∂Í kaµ triav konta: rJ htorikh; n ga; r pepoÇhken anakefalaÇwsin kaµ ej pitomh; n thÅ Í ∆OdusseÇaÍ), the scholiast argues against Aristarchus for his athetesis of Od. 23.310-43 with arguments that recall Arist., Rh. 1417a12-15 (eß ti pepragmev na de∂ lev gein o § sa mh; prattov mena h˙ oπkton h˙ deÇnwsin fev rei: parav deigma oJ ÂlkÇnou apov logoÍ, o ¶ Í pro; Í th; n Phnelov phn ej n eJ xhv konta eß pesin pepoÇhtai), where the philosopher praises the story Odysseus tells Penelope as a good way of narrating a story cutting off all the most terrifying details. However, my claim here is that, even if we find more Aristotelian concepts in the exegetical scholia (which are a product of later scholarship), we do find Aristotelian concepts even in Aristarchus, and in opposition to the other Hellenistic theorists.
